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Abstract
We study how lines form in front of banks. In our model, depositors choose
first the level of effort to arrive early at the bank and then whether or not
to withdraw their deposit. We argue that the informational environment
(i.e., the possibility of observing the action of others) affects the emergence
of bank runs and should, therefore, influence the line formation. We test
this prediction experimentally. While the informational environment has no
effect on the line formation when we look at the average level of effort, our
findings suggest that the reasons to arrive early at the bank varies across
informational environment. Thus, expectations on the occurrence of bank
run are key to explain the level of effort when depositors cannot observe the
action of others. In this setting, depositors who expect a run arrive early at
the bank to withdraw their funds. If actions can be observed, however, those
who expect a run arrive early at the bank to keep their funds deposited.
Depending on the informational environment, there are other factors (e.g.,
irrationality of depositors or loss aversion) that also explain the behavior of
depositors.
Keywords: bank run, beliefs, experimental economics, line formation, loss
aversion, observability.
JEL: code, C91, D90, G21, G40, J16
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1. Introduction
The global financial crisis that started in 2007 has shown that bank runs
are existing and important phenomena. According to the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), more than 300 banks failed only in the US
in the first three years of the crisis.1 In many instances, the immediate
cause of the failure was a bank run. Such events did not only happen in
the US, but also occurred worldwide in developed and developing countries;
take, for example, the DSB Bank in the Netherlands or the Jiangsu Sheyang
Rural Commercial Bank in China. Run-like phenomena have also occurred
in the repo market (Gorton and Metrick, 2012) or bank lending (Ivashina
and Scharfstein, 2010). These events have noteworthy economic and political consequences (Caprio and Klingebiel, 1999; Laeven and Valencia, 2013;
Tooze, 2018), and they also affect individuals’ well-being (Montagnoli and
Moro, 2018). Governments took actions to restore the confidence in the financial sector by increasing the deposit insurance coverage or bailing out
failing banks. Hence, understanding bank runs is of first-order importance
to find the right policy responses to deal with them properly in the future.
Since the seminal paper by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), there is an increasing theoretical, empirical and experimental literature that has explored
why and how bank runs occur and how to prevent them. Some studies highlight the role of policy tools, like suspension of convertibility (Zhu, 2005;
Ennis and Keister, 2009; Davis and Reilly, 2016) or deposit insurance (Zhu,
2005; Madies, 2006; Schotter and Yorulmazer, 2009; Kiss et al., 2012; Iyer
et al., 2016; Peia and Vranceanu, 2019). Other studies investigate the importance of individual characteristics on depositors’ behavior (Gráda and
White, 2003; Kiss et al., 2014b, 2016b; Iyer et al., 2016; Dijk, 2017; Shakina
and Angerer, 2018). There is, however, a lack of explanations on how the
lines form in front of the banks. More specifically, we have no evidence on
what factors affect the depositors’ decision on when to go to the bank. As
Ennis and Keister (2010) point out: ”In the Diamond-Dybvig tradition, the
order in which agents get an opportunity to withdraw is assumed to be exogenously given (generally determined by a random draw). In other words,
agents in the model are not allowed to take explicit actions to change their
order of arrival. This assumption is, of course, extreme and, unfortunately,
1

This is in sharp contrast with the 22 banks that failed between 2001-2006. The complete list of failed bank can be accessed at https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/.
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not much is known so far about the case where it is not made.” 2 The current
paper is an attempt to fill this void in the literature.
Our study builds on the canonical Diamond-Dybvig framework with two
types of depositors: impatient depositors (who are hit by a liquidity shock
and need to withdraw immediately) and patient depositors (without urgent
liquidity needs and who can withdraw or keep their funds deposited). In our
model, there is an implicit penalty for early withdrawal because if patient
depositors withdraw, they forgo the highest payoff that they would obtain if
keeping their funds deposited. Thus, patient depositors can provoke a bank
run if they withdraw immediately.3 We rely on two different information
environments that differ in whether or not depositors can observe the decision of others when making their decisions. The observability of actions
has been shown to be crucial to depositors’ behavior in theoretical models
(Kinateder and Kiss, 2014; Horváth and Kiss, 2016), empirical studies (Kelly
and O Grada, 2000; Starr and Yilmaz, 2007; Iyer and Puri, 2012; Bursztyn
et al., 2014; Atmaca et al., 2017; Artavanis et al., 2019) and laboratory experiments (Garratt and Keister, 2009; Schotter and Yorulmazer, 2009; Kiss
et al., 2014a, 2018; Bayona and Peia, 2020).4 These papers focus on depositors’ reaction when they observe the action of others, while leaving aside the
question whether (and how) this affects the willingness to arrive early at the
bank. This is the chief question we want to address in the current paper.5
Our first informational environment is characterized by the lack of in2
Along the same lines, some theoretical models assume that positions are exogenously
determined in a random manner; see, e.g., Green and Lin (2003); Andolfatto et al. (2007);
Ennis et al. (2009); Kinateder and Kiss (2014).
3
It depends on the environment how many early withdrawals the bank can serve before
the payoff corresponding to keeping the funds in the bank becomes lower than the payoff
related to immediate withdrawal.
4
There is also evidence that observability of actions affects if a bank run becomes
contagious (Brown et al., 2016; Chakravarty et al., 2014; Duffy et al., 2019; Trevino,
2020). For a recent literature review on contagion in financial networks see Glasserman
and Young (2016). Duffy (2016), Dufwenberg (2015), Kiss et al. (2016a) and Kiss et al.
(2022) also present recent advances on experimental finance, including a discussion on
bank runs.
5
Note, however, that the depositor’s decision can also be useful to explain her decision
to arrive early at the bank: if a depositor arrives late at the bank and withdraws, she may
receive only a lower amount than her initial deposit, while arriving early would have given
her a larger amount. Hence, withdrawal decision and decision when to contact the bank
can be interrelated, as we show in the paper.
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formation about previous decisions, so depositors decide (simultaneously)
whether or not to withdraw without knowing the decision of preceding depositors, in line with Diamond and Dybvig (1983). The second informational
environment represents the opposite, so depositors observe all previous decisions. These informational environments resemble conditions akin to bank
run episodes that occurred during the last financial crisis. For example,
the US bank Washington Mutual experienced massive online withdrawal in
September 2008, a so-called ”silent bank run” since the decision of other depositors could not be observed. Arguably, the run on the UK bank Northern
Rock in 2007 was not silent as depositors could see the long lines in front
of the banks and the media covered extensively the events. Our paper highlights that theoretically the observability of actions is key to understanding
whether or not bank runs emerge as a coordination problem, and this should
affect how lines of depositors are formed.
Altogether, we consider a two-stage game. In stage 1, depositors decide
their effort level to arrive early at the bank simultaneously, and the line is
formed accordingly: depositors who make a more costly effort to arrive early
at the bank (in the form of higher bids), get a position at the beginning of the
line.6 In stage 2, depositors decide whether to keep their funds in the bank
or withdraw them immediately. When decisions cannot be observed, there
are multiple equilibria in stage 2. In the efficient equilibrium resulting in no
bank run, patient depositors keep their funds deposited. In the inefficient
symmetric equilibrium with a bank run, patient depositors withdraw their
funds immediately, which is optimal if all patient depositors believe that all
other patient depositors will withdraw, making the bank run a self-fulfilling
prophecy.7 When decisions in stage 2 can be observed, there is a unique
equilibrium without bank runs, because the observability of actions solves
6
We are not aware of any other paper that endogeneizes the order of decisions in
a bank run model, but there have been other attempts in the literature on investments,
including models of herding (Ivanov et al., 2013), war of attrition (Wagner, 2018) or global
coordination games (Brindisi et al., 2014).
7
Similarly to Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the bank in our setup does not have any
fundamental problem, so bank runs arise due to coordination problems among the depositors. Although fundamentally weaker banks are more likely to be affected by bank runs,
there is empirical evidence that even fundamentally healthy financial intermediaries suffer
bank runs (e.g. Saunders and Wilson, 1996; Kindleberger and O’Keefe, 2003; Davison and
Ramirez, 2014; De Graeve and Karas, 2014). In fact, fundamentals are important but
leave unexplained part of the banking failures (e.g. Ennis, 2003; Boyd et al., 2014).
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the coordination problem. Thus, it is possible to coordinate on the efficient
equilibrium (Kiss et al., 2012; Kinateder and Kiss, 2014). The rationale for
this result is that patient depositors, by keeping their money in the bank, are
able to induce other patient depositors to keep their funds deposited as well.
This, in turn, implies that any observed withdrawal should be attributed
to an impatient depositor who needs the funds immediately: i.e., patient
depositors keep their funds deposited in equilibrium, even if they observe
withdrawals from previous depositors.
We rely on backward induction to derive our hypotheses for stage 1 of
the game, in which the line of decision is formed endogenously. If depositors
cannot observe the action of others, beliefs on the occurrence of bank run
determine which equilibrium is chosen in stage 2. As a result, when depositors
have no information on the action of others, they should only make a costly
effort to arrive early at the bank in stage 1 if they expect a bank run in stage 2,
and those who run should withdraw their funds. If no bank run is anticipated,
then no costly effort should be made to rush to the bank (see Hypothesis 1 in
section 2.4). If we assume that bank runs are due to coordination problems,
the observability of actions leads to a unique no-run equilibrium in stage 2, so
depositors should make no effort to arrive early at the bank regardless of their
types (patient or impatient) if actions can be observed. Thus, if bank runs
are due to coordination problems among depositors, then we expect to see
that depositors make more effort to arrive early at the bank when depositors
have no information on the decision of others, compared with the case in
which this information exists (see Hypothesis 2 in section 2.4). Furthermore,
we expect that patient and impatient depositors will not behave differently
in stage 1 in any of the informational environments, e.g., if they have the
same expectations regarding bank runs in stage 2. However, the observation
of withdrawals may perturb the beliefs of depositors about the occurrence
of bank runs. Kiss et al. (2018) provide experimental evidence that patient
depositors tend to run when withdrawals are observed because they attribute
them to other patient depositors, contrary to the theoretical prediction. Kiss
et al. (2018) refer to these bank runs that occur after observing previous
withdrawals as panic bank runs. Then, if depositors expect a panic bank run
in stage 2, both patient and impatient depositors have incentives to make
costly efforts to arrive earlier at the bank (see Hypothesis 3 in section 2.4).
We test these hypotheses by means of a laboratory experiment. We consider two different treatments (NoINFO vs INFO) that differ on the information available to depositors when they have to decide between withdrawing
5

or keeping their funds deposited. In the NoINFO treatment, depositors do
not observe previous decisions, while in the INFO treatment they do. When
comparing the behavior in stage 1 across treatments, we find that depositors make similar efforts to arrive early at the bank in both the NoINFO
and the INFO treatments. In the NoINFO treatment, the depositors’ beliefs
about the occurrence of bank runs predict their withdrawal decisions (i.e.,
depositors are more likely to withdraw when they expect a bank run). These
expectations on the occurrence of bank runs also influence their decision on
when to arrive at the bank (i.e., patient depositors who want to withdraw
their funds in the NoINFO treatment arrive earlier at the bank). In addition,
we do not find differences in the costly efforts to arrive early across liquidity types (patient vs. impatient) in the NoINFO treatment. These findings
support our Hypotheses 1 and 2 regarding the line formation and the occurrence of bank runs when decisions cannot be observed. When actions are
observable, we find that two factors can explain the costly effort made by
patient depositors. On the one hand, there is evidence that some patient
depositors are irrational and rush to withdraw their deposits. On the other
hand, we find a substantial share of subjects that seem to anticipate that
bank runs may occur because of panic. These subjects make costly efforts
to arrive early at the bank and keep the funds deposited to facilitate coordination on the efficient outcome. Thus, our findings in the INFO treatment
suggest that panic bank runs are a main determinant of the line formation
when depositors can observe the action of others, as suggested by Hypothesis
3.
Previous empirical and experimental research has studied the effect of
individual characteristics on the willingness to withdraw (Gráda and White,
2003; Trautmann and Vlahu, 2013; Kiss et al., 2016b, 2014b; Iyer et al., 2016;
Dijk, 2017; Shakina and Angerer, 2018).8 We contribute to this literature by
looking at the determinants of line formation.9 We rely on the experimental
methodology to test the predictions of our model, so our approach comple8

Starting with Diamond and Dybvig (1983) most of the theoretical studies on bank
runs assume that depositors are homogeneous, except for their liquidity needs (Green and
Lin, 2000; Zhu, 2005; Ennis and Keister, 2009). However, depositors in real life differ in a
myriad of ways.
9
There has been other approaches that give depositors multiple opportunities to withdraw, thus allowing depositors to decide when to withdraw (Gu, 2011; Garratt and Keister,
2009; Schotter and Yorulmazer, 2009; Shakina and Angerer, 2018).
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ments other studies that employ survey data in financial economics (Graham
and Harvey, 2001; Guiso et al., 2013, 2018). In these studies, participants are
presented hypothetical scenarios and are asked to make a choice; e.g., Guiso
et al. (2013) study strategic default on mortgages by asking participants their
willingness to walk away from their mortgage depending on how the value of
the mortgage exceeds the value of their houses.10 In their survey, participants
are presented with different sizes of shortfalls. The authors find that these
values affect their willingness to default in a non-linear manner. They also
find that a series of variables (including the cost of relocation, the stability of
the financial position, or the individual characteristics) affect the willingness
to default strategically. We employ the strategy method in our experiment,
so participants have also been presented with a series of scenarios. One feature that makes our paper divert from survey studies is that decisions in our
setting have monetary consequences for participants; i.e., one of the scenarios
is paid out at the end of the experiment. This, in turn, relates our study to
recent papers that employ the experimental methodology to learn about the
behavior of depositors during bank run episodes (see Kiss et al. (2022) for a
recent review of the experimental literature on bank runs).
To account for depositor heterogeneity, we measure some relevant individual traits of the participants in the experiment. More concretely, we collect
data on gender and attitude toward uncertainty (risk aversion, loss aversion,
ambiguity aversion). Moreover, we control for a wide range of other variables,
like age, cognitive abilities, income, trust in institutions, or personality traits
(Big Five and Social Value Orientation). Our strong interest in the attitude
toward uncertainty is motivated by the fact that in many countries regulation
requires banks to draw a risk profile of the customers (see, e.g., the Markets
in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) in the EU, Article 25/2 of European Parliament (2014) or Article 30/1 of European Parliament (2016)). In
our analysis, loss aversion indeed emerges as an important factor to explain
line formation and the depositors’ decisions. Thus, we find that loss-averse
depositors are (less) more likely to arrive early at the bank when observability is (not) possible, thus when they have (no) information about the action
of others, respectively. Loss-averse depositors are also more likely to panic
when they observe a withdrawal. This result is in line with recent exper10

There is strategic default on mortgages when homeowners decide to walk away from
their mortgages, even if they could afford to pay them.
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imental findings (Haigh and List, 2005; Trautmann and Vlahu, 2013; Rau,
2014; Huber et al., 2017), pointing out that loss aversion plays an important
role in financial decisions. As a result, our findings support the view that
theory should incorporate loss aversion into models of bank runs.
Our study considers factors that can be affected by policy (e.g., the informational environment), while others cannot (e.g., individual characteristics).
Policymakers should try to assess how all these factors affect the willingness
to arrive early at the bank to design optimal policies that can prevent bank
runs, e.g., setting up deposit insurance depending on the risk attitude of
depositors or promoting the informational environment leading to less runs.
Importantly, we show that depositors’ expectations are crucial to explaining
their behavior, and we think that expectations can be affected by credible
policies, e.g., a well-functioning deposit insurance may make depositors believe that other depositors are not likely to withdraw.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our
theoretical model for three depositors and the testable hypotheses. Section 3
contains the experimental design and the procedures. In section 4, we present
the results. Section 5 concludes. We relegate to the Appendix the general
theoretical model and the instructions of the experiment. The Appendix also
contains further empirical analysis.
2. Model and Hypotheses
We present a basic theoretical model of endogenous line formation in
section 2.1. Then, we describe our experimental model, a small-scale theoretical framework with three depositors, in section 2.2. This is the simplest
setting to study the coordination problem embedded in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). In section 2.3, we discuss the underlying assumptions of the
model before deriving the hypotheses for each informational environment in
Section 2.4. Section 2.5 discusses the potential influence of individual traits
on depositors’ behavior.
2.1. Theoretical bank-run game with line formation
We study a situation where depositors contact the bank and form a line,
and then they decide whether to withdraw or keep their funds deposited,
following the spirit of Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Importantly, the position
in the line is determined by the depositor’s effort that we capture in the form
of a bid.
8

Timing
There are three time periods denoted by t = 0, 1, 2. In period t = 0,
depositors deposit their funds in the bank. At the beginning of t = 1, some
depositors are hit by a liquidity shock and become impatient. The rest of
the depositors are of the patient type who derive utility from consumption in
periods 1 and 2. In period 1, depositors make the following decisions: i) first
they decide the effort level they exert in order to arrive at the bank as fast
as possible, a process that determines the sequence of withdrawal decisions
(bidding stage); ii) and then they decide whether to withdraw or to keep
their money deposited (withdrawal decision). Then the bank pays according
to the withdrawal decisions in periods 1 and 2.
Depositors
There is a finite set of depositors denoted by I = {1, ..., N }, where N > 2.
The consumption of depositor i ∈ I in period t = 1, 2 is denoted by ct,i ∈ R0+ ,
and her liquidity type by θi . It is a random variable with support given by
the set of liquidity types Θ = {0, 1}. If θi = 1, depositor i is called impatient,
so she only cares about consumption at t = 1. If θi = 0, depositor i is called
patient. While the type of each depositor is private information, the number
of patient depositors is assumed to be constant, given by p ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}
and common knowledge. The remaining
depositors (N − p) are impatient. A
P
N
type liquidity vector θ ∈ Θ :
θi = p indicates the type of each depositor.
θi ∈Θ

Thus, there is no aggregate uncertainty regarding the liquidity preference of
the depositors.11
Depositors face a cost when they go to the bank, bi , which represents the
effort level they make to arrive early at the bank.12 Depositors are expected
utility maximizers, and we consider preferences that are quasilinear with
respect to the cost associated with contacting the bank. Therefore, for a
given consumption level in each of the two periods and a chosen effort level,
depositor i’s utility is given by:
11

Following Diamond and Dybvig (1983) this is the most frequent assumption in the
literature, though there are papers that apply fundamental uncertainty, e.g. Green and
Lin (2003).
12
In real life, the costly effort need not be monetary, it may involve for instance the
opportunity cost related to spending time and effort on withdrawing early from the bank.
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ūi (c1,i , c2,i , θi ) = ui (c1,i + (1 − θi )c2,i ) − bi (θi ).

(1)

with ui strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice continuosly differentiable and satisfying the Inada conditions. Without loss of generality, we
assume that ui (0) = 0. Note that for the overall utility (including consumption and the effort) we use the notation ū to separate it from the utility
derived from consumption (u).
The bank
At t = 0, each depositor i ∈ I has one unit of a homogeneous good which
she deposits in the bank.13 The bank invests the deposits in a safe technology
that pays a unit gross return after each unit of investment liquidated at t = 1
and R > 1 after each unit of investment at t = 2. The long-term return,
R, is constant. Therefore, the bank is fundamentally in good condition, and
there is no uncertainty in this regard.
The bank offers a simple demand deposit contract to the depositors.
The contract stipulates that upon withdrawal in period 1 depositors receive
c1 > 1, unless the available funds decrease to very low levels or zero. More
concretely, we assume that the bank pays c1 to the first τ̄ ≥ N − φ withdrawing depositors (to be derived later). For simplicity, we assume that an
optimization exercise in the spirit of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) determines
c1 . The first best allocation solves
max(N − p)u(c1 ) + pu(c2 )
c1 ,c2

s. t. (N − p)c1 +

p
c2 = N.
R

(2)

We omit the subscript i from the optimization as depositors have identical
utility functions. The solution to this problem is
u0 (c∗1 ) = Ru0 (c∗2 ),

(3)

which, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), implies that R > c∗2 > c∗1 > 1.
In the first-best allocation, all impatient depositors consume c∗1 at t = 1,
and all patient ones c∗2 at t = 2. Hence, patient depositors receive a higher
consumption than impatient ones.
13

We disregard the pre-deposit game described by Peck and Shell (2003).

10

Let η ∈ {0, ..., p} be the number of depositors who keep their funds deposited at t = 1.14 Following the Diamond-Dybvig model, we assume that
all players who keep their money in the bank at t = 1 obtain the same
consumption at t = 2, namely,
c2 (η) = max{0,

R(N − (N − η)c∗1 )
}.
η

(4)

If η = p, only impatient depositors withdraw at t = 1, and c2 (η) = c∗2 > c∗1 .
Then, patient depositors enjoy a higher consumption than impatient ones.
Given p, N and c∗1 , it is possible to determine how many patient depositors
have to keep their funds deposited so that it is an optimal strategy for each
of them. Period-2 consumption is higher than consumption received after
withdrawing at t = 1 if the following holds
R(N − (N − η)c∗1 )
> c∗1 .
η
This condition is equivalent to
η>

RN (c∗1 − 1)
.
c∗1 (R − 1)

Since η is a natural number, so the previous condition becomes


RN (c∗1 − 1)
+ 1,
η ≥ int
c∗1 (R − 1)

(5)

(6)

(7)

where int denotes the integer part. Given p, N and c∗1 , there is a unique
η̄ such that 1 ≤ η̄ ≤ p, and for every patient depositor i who keeps the funds
∗
deposited receives c2 (η) ≤ c∗1 , for all η h≤ η̄,
i and c2 (η) > c1 , for all hη >i η̄.
The bank is able to pay c∗1 to int cN∗ depositors. After int cN∗ with1
1
drawals, the bank has possibly some funds left over (it can be 0 or a positive
amount, but it is strictly less than c∗1 ) that it can pay to the next withdrawing depositor. We denote this sum clow
1 . All subsequent depositors who want
to withdraw, as well as those who keep the money deposited, receive zero
consumption.
14

Note that η is restricted to be equal to p or smaller since an impatient depositor has
a dominant strategy to withdraw, and thus, not more than p depositors will keep their
funds deposited.
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The bank-run game with line formation
In period 1, the bank-run game with line formation takes place. At
the beginning of period 1, nature assigns liquidity types to the depositors
by choosing any (liquidity) type vector θ with equal probability (i.e., each
depositor has the same probability of being patient or impatient).
In the first stage of period 1, once liquidity type is (privately) revealed,
depositors choose the effort to arrive at the bank, and the line is formed.
Positions in the line are determined according to the effort level chosen by
the depositor. Higher effort increases the probability of obtaining an early
position. We assume that efforts are not publicly observable.
In the second stage of period 1, depositors decide sequentially whether
to keep their money in the bank or withdraw their funds. Regarding the
information that depositors have in the second stage, we consider two setups:
i) no information (NoINFO) and ii) information (INFO). In the NoINFO
setup, depositors decide in sequence according to their efforts, but neither
the own position nor the other depositors’ actions are observed. In the INFO
setup, previous decisions are observed (and hence the position is also known).
bi ∈ [0, bmax ] denotes depositor i’s effort in the first stage. The ranking
of efforts determines the sequence of decisions. If more than one depositor
exerts the same level of effort, then each of them has the same probability of
being in the given position. Let b = (b1 , ..bi , ..bN ) be the vector of the chosen
efforts. Function r(bi , b) : bi × b → [1, N ] ranks the efforts and determines
the sequence. We denote by ri the position of depositor i.
The decision of an impatient depositor in the withdrawal decision stage is
always to withdraw (s = 1). In the NoINFO setup, the decision of a patient
depositor in the withdrawal decision stage is binary, si ∈ {0, 1} where 0 denotes keeping the money in the bank, while 1 stands for withdrawal. In the
INFO setup, the patient depositor has a binary decision in each of the possible information sets she may be in, which are determined by the sequence of
previous decisions of each type up to the
Ppoint when the depositor decides,
k
si,ψ ∈ {0, 1} , ψ ∈ {0, 1} , k ∈ [0, N − 1], ψ > (k − p − 1). Note that information sets are defined as sequences of 0 and 1, since in the INFO setup, a
depositor in position k + 1 observes the k previous decisions. Note that in
each information set, there is uncertainty about the observed withdrawals in
the sense that it is not clear if they were due to a patient or to an impatient
depositor.
The payment obtained by each depositor from the bank is ct,i , where t ∈

12

{1, 2} depending on the withdrawal decision of the depositor. The payments
are as follows:

c1,i =



















c∗1 ,

if si = 1 and

rP
i −1
j=1
rP
i −1

sj < int

h i
N
c∗1

,

h i

sj = int cN∗ ,
1
j=1
h
i
rP
−1
i
0, if si = 1 and
sj > int cN∗
1
j=1

c2 (η), if si = 0
c2,i =

clow
1 ,

if si = 1 and

(8)

The first row says that if the bank has enough funds (that is, the number
of previous withdrawals is sufficiently low) and depositor i decides to withdraw, then she receives c∗1 . However, if previous withdrawals depleted the
funds of the bank in such a way that it has less than c∗1 , then the bank pays
whatever is left to the withdrawing depositor. If a depositor who attempts to
withdraw comes too late, then she receives zero consumption. The last line
describes period-2 consumption for those who keep their funds deposited,
c2 (η) is given by (4).
NoINFO setup
A (pure) strategy of a depositor is given by her bid when acting as impatient, her bid when acting as patient depositor, and her choice to keep the
money deposited or withdraw. Thus, in the NoINFO setup, we define the
pat
strategy of depositor j as σj = (bimp
j , bj , sj ) ∈ ([0, bmax ] × [0, bmax ] × 0, 1).
Let σ = (σ1 , σ2 , ..σN ) be a profile of strategies for each depositor. Note that
given σ, each depositor i has an (expected) position in the line and this position plus the strategy determines the payments that the bank will make.
Each depositor will be of a given type according to the (liquidity) type vector
selected by nature, θ. Since all type vectors are equiprobable, each depositor
is patient with probability Np or impatient with probability (NN−p) . Thus, the
expected payoff for each depositor i is
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πi (σ) =

(N − p) X
E [u(c1,i )P (c1,i | σ, θ, θi = 0)P (θ)]
N
c1,i

p X
E [u(c2,i )P (c2,i | σ, θ, θi = 1)P (θ)]]
+ 
N c
2,i

X
+[
E [u(c1,i )P (c1,i | σ, θ, θi = 1)P (θ)] ,

(9)

c1,i

where P (ct,i | σ, θ, θi ) denotes the probability that depositor i receives
consumption ct,i given the strategy profile of depositors, the type vector and
her liquidity type, while P (θ) denotes the probability of a given type vector.
In the NoINFO setup, we use the notion of symmetric Bayesian Equilibrium in pure strategies (which is equivalent to PBE given that all the
decisions occur simultaneously, and which is the concept that we apply in
the INFO setup).
Definition
σ ∗ is a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies in the simultaneous setup if it is a pure strategy and
πi (σi = σ ∗ ; σk = σ ∗ , ∀k ∈ I) ≥ πi (σi0 ; σk = σ ∗ , ∀k ∈ I), ∀σi0 .
Proposition 1
There is always an equilibrium where patient depositors keep their money
deposited, and in this equilibrium nobody makes any effort to go to the
bank. Additionally, there is a bank-run equilibrium where depositors make
a positive effort to arrive early at the bank if and only if the highest possible
effort is bounded and the bound is sufficiently low.
The proof is relegated to Appendix A.
Proposition 1 shows that an equilibrium with positive effort requires that
the maximum effort is bounded below. We discuss here briefly why it is the
case. Note that an equilibrium with positive efforts requires that nobody
has any incentive to deviate. Focus on the depositors who are exerting the
highest effort in equilibrium. There are two possibilities: they are obtaining
the highest payoff from the bank with probability 1 (if the bank has enough
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funds to pay to all depositors exerting the highest effort) or with probability
< 1 (if the bank has not enough funds to pay every depositor exerting the
highest effort). The first case cannot be an equilibrium because then the
depositor could exert an effort slightly lower, and still receive the same payoff.
In the second case, if she receives the highest payoff with probability < 1,
she could increase her payoff by slightly increasing the effort and receiving
the maximum payment from the bank with probability 1. It implies that, in
order to have such an equilibrium, the maximum effort must be bounded. In
Appendix A, we prove this result formally.
INFO setup
We turn now to the INFO setup. We define the strategy of depositor j
pat
as σj = (bimp
j , bj , sj | ϕ), ∀ϕ, where ϕ is each of the information sets that
may occur in the INFO setup (that is, all the possible sequences of withdrawals and keeping the money deposited). When all the previous actions
are observed, depositors must form a belief about the sequence that has been
selected (the sequence of patient and impatient depositors). Therefore, beliefs in a particular information set define a probability distribution about
the possible sequences that may have occurred. This can also be understood
as beliefs on the possible efforts exerted by the different depositors. Beliefs
are assumed to be homogeneous for all depositors.
In the INFO setup, we use the notion of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
(PBE).
Definition
In the symmetric setup, a strategy σ ∗ = (bimp,∗ , bpat,∗ , s∗ | ϕ), ∀ϕ and a
belief system about the type sequence µ({θ}N | ϕ), ∀ϕ represent a symmetric
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies if i) σ ∗ is a pure strategy
chosen by all depositors, ii) in each information set there is no profitable
deviation conditional on µ, and iii) µ({θ}N | ϕ), ∀ϕ is consistent with σ ∗
applying the Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
Proposition 2
In the INFO setup, in the unique PBE, patient and impatient depositors
do not exert any effort to arrive at the bank, and patient depositors keep the
money deposited on the equilibrium path.
Proof
In a symmetric equilibrium, there can be three cases: 1) bimp,∗ > bpat,∗ ,
which implies that impatient depositors arrive first; 2) bpat,∗ > bimp,∗ , en15

tailing that patient depositors arrive first; and 3) bpat,∗ = bimp,∗ , so all the
possible type sequences are equiprobable.
Note that in cases 1) and 2), consistent beliefs about the type sequence
require considering with probability 1 that the depositors of each type are
first or second. This implies that the situation is equivalent to a game of
perfect information. Proposition 1 in Kinateder and Kiss (2014) uses backward induction to show that in a bank-run game of this type with perfect
information patient depositors keep the money deposited in any equilibrium.
Note that it implies a symmetric strategy.
In case 3), consistent beliefs about the type sequence imply that all sequences are equiprobable. Proposition 3 in Kinateder and Kiss (2014) shows
that in a bank-run game of this type with equiprobable sequences, patient
depositors keep the money deposited in any equilibrium. Note that it implies
a symmetric strategy.
Therefore, we have proved that in any continuation game after the formation of the line, patient depositors keep the money deposited in any PBE.
Note that if a PBE includes a strictly positive effort to arrive at the bank,
there is a profitable deviation for the depositor because exerting a lower effort would not change the payment received from the bank. Therefore, in
a PBE, depositors do not exert any effort and patient depositors keep the
money deposited.

2.2. The experimental model
Our experimental model is a particular reduced version of the general
model in which decisions and efforts are studied with a quasi-linear utility
function. In our experimental model, we separate the two decisions and
assign an independent budget to choose the effort level. Such a model extends
the bank-run game in Kiss et al. (2014a) to incorporate a stage in which
depositors can make costly efforts (in the form of a bid) to obtain a position
in the line. The timeline is slightly different from the general model to make it
easier to understand for experimental subjects. In our experimental model,
three depositors are endowed with 40 ECUs, automatically deposited in a
common bank at t = 0, and with 20 ECUs, used to choose the effort level.
The bank will invest the total endowment (120 ECUs) in a risk-free project
that yields a guaranteed positive net return after t = 2. The bank, however,
can liquidate any fraction of the investment before the project is carried out.
Depositors learn their liquidity needs after depositing their endowment
in the bank. In particular, one of the depositors is hit by a liquidity shock,
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and is forced to withdraw her funds from the bank. There is no aggregate
uncertainty about the liquidity demand; i.e., it is common knowledge that
one of the three depositors will need the money and will withdraw with
certainty. We refer to this depositor as the impatient depositor, whereas the
depositors who can choose to keep their funds deposited or withdraw are
called patient depositors.
At t = 1, first depositors learn their liquidity needs (patient or impatient),
then they bid (simultaneously) for a position in the line (bidding stage). We
interpret the bid as the level of costly effort to arrive early at the bank that
depositors are willing to exert. Once the line is formed, depositors choose at
t = 2 according to the order determined by the bids between withdrawing
their funds from the bank or keeping them deposited (withdrawal decision).
We hereafter refer to depositor i as the one in position i={1,2,3}.
The bank cannot condition the payoffs on the liquidity needs of depositors,
which is not observable. Payoffs depend on the position in the line and the
decisions of depositors at t = 2 (see Table 1). If a depositor decides to
withdraw, she immediately receives 50 ECUs as long as there is enough money
in the bank to pay this amount (out of this amount, 40 ECUs correspond to
the initial endowment, and 10 ECUs are obtained in the form of interest).
In our experiment, if depositor 1 or 2 withdraws, she definitely receives 50
ECUs. However, if depositor 3 decides to withdraw after two withdrawals,
she only receives 20 ECUs (the bank has only 20 ECUs left to pay depositor
3, because the first two depositors who withdrew received 50 ECUs each).
Nonetheless, if depositor 3 withdraws after less than two withdrawals, the
bank pays her 50 ECUs.
If you keep the funds deposited and…
Your position in the line
1º
2º
3º

If you withdraw
(only possible action if impatient)
50
50
20 or 50

another depositor keeps the
fund in the bank

you are the only one who
keeps the fund deposited

70

30

Table 1: Payoffs of the bank run game depending on the position of depositors and their
choices.

While impatient depositors are forced to withdraw at t = 2, patient
depositors can decide to keep their funds deposited. If they do, they are paid
at t = 3 once the bank carries out the project (see Figure 1). The amount that
patient depositors receive at t = 3 depends on the total number of depositors
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who keep their money in the bank at t = 2. If only one depositor keeps her
money deposited, she receives 30 ECUs. If two depositors do so, then their
payoff is 70 ECUs. This payoff structure implies that early withdrawals from
patient depositors carry an implicit penalty if the other patient depositor
decides to keep her funds deposited at t = 2, because a patient depositor
who withdraws in this case obtains 50 ECUs at t = 2 instead of 70 ECUs at
t = 3. Note also that position in the line is only relevant if there is a run
(i.e., when patient depositors withdraw at t = 2), because then arriving late
(that is, in position 3) yields only 20 ECUs instead of 50 ECUs.
Overall, these payoffs follow Diamond and Dybvig (1983) in that i) if all
patient depositors keep their money in the bank, then they receive the highest
payoff (70 ECUs in our case); ii) if there are too many withdrawals, notably
due to withdrawing patient depositors, then the payoff of patient depositors
who keep their funds deposited may be lower than the payoff related to
immediate withdrawal (receiving 50 ECUs upon withdrawal vs. 30 ECUs if
keeping the money in the bank in our case); and iii) early withdrawal yields
a higher payoff than the initial deposit (50 ECUs vs 40 ECUs in our case).
The sequence of events is presented in Figure 1.
Depositors deposit 40 ECUs
in a common bank

t=0

Depositors learn their types
(patient vs impatient)
(patient vs

Depositors bid
(simultaneously) for a
position in the line

t=1

Depositors decide (simultaneously or
sequentially) whether to withdraw their
funds immediately or to keep them
deposited

t=2

The bank carries out the project
and depositors who kept their
funds in the bank receive their
earnings

t=3

Figure 1: Sequence of events in the game

2.3. Underlying assumptions and parametrization
Before discussing our hypotheses, there are some aspects of our model that
are worth mentioning. First, we constrain the bid at t = 1 to be an integer
number between 0 and 20, both included. This assumption implies that
depositors can only bid the part of their endowment that was not deposited
in the bank and imposes some form of rationality because depositors cannot
have losses in the experiment. Further, the amount not used for bidding adds
to the final payoff of the depositor. For example, if a patient depositor bids
15 and only the impatient depositor withdraws, she receives (20-15)+70=75
ECUs.
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Second, our model assumes that depositors who withdraw receive their
money immediately, while those who keep their funds deposited receive the
money once the bank carries out the project. This is important for the return
on investment (ROI) and the liquidation costs. When only the impatient
depositor withdraws, she receives 50 ECUs immediately, and 70 ECUs are
invested into the project, so the patient depositors who keep their funds
deposited receive 70 ECUs each (i.e., 140 ECUs in total). This corresponds
to a ROI equal to (140 − 70)/70 = 100%. However, if one of the patient
depositors withdraws early, the one who keeps her funds deposited receives
30 ECUs (after an investment of 20 ECUs). This amount corresponds to a
ROI equal to (30 − 20)/20 = 50%. As a result, we (implicitly) assume that
there is a liquidation cost for the bank if patient depositors withdraw early,
similar to other bank run studies (Cooper and Ross, 1998; Ennis and Keister,
2009).
We want to study the behavior of depositors in two different informational
environments, depending on whether or not they can observe the action of
other depositors. The fact that all decisions can be observed in our INFO
environment implies that depositors do not only observe the withdrawal decision of others, but also know whether others have kept their funds deposited.
This assumption is part of recent theoretical models (Green and Lin, 2003;
Kinateder and Kiss, 2014) and supported by empirical studies that show that
in many instances depositors observe the decision of others in their social network or neighbourhood (Kelly and O Grada, 2000; Starr and Yilmaz, 2007;
Iyer and Puri, 2012; Iyer et al., 2016; Atmaca et al., 2017; Artavanis et al.,
2019). Experimental studies have also incorporated this feature; see, among
others, Kiss et al. (2014a, 2018) or Shakina and Angerer (2018).15
Finally, it is worth noting that patient depositors in position 3 should
always keep their funds deposited, regardless of what they observe (if anything). This is the case because keeping the funds deposited always entails
higher payoffs to a patient depositor 3 than withdrawing for any possible
history of decisions; i.e., after two withdrawals, depositor 3 receives 30 ECUs
if she keeps her funds deposited and 20 ECUs if she withdraws. If a depositor
keeps her money in the bank and only the impatient depositor withdraws,
then in position 3 it is better to keep the funds deposited and earn the highest
15

As we discuss in section 5 one relevant situation would be to study behavior when
actions cannot be observed at the individual level, but at the aggregate level.
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payoff (70 ECUs vs. 50 ECUs). This feature of our model is also present in
Green and Lin (2003) or Ennis and Keister (2010).16 In fact, this will help us
identify irrational depositors in our experiment to test whether irrationality
affects behavior.17
2.4. Hypotheses
We focus on the polar situations in which observation of decisions is either
absent or complete. The former case corresponds to the NoINFO environment (previous decisions cannot be observed), while the latter is represented
by the INFO environment (both keeping the money deposited and withdrawal
are observable, and depositors decide sequentially according to their position
in the line). Next, we derive theoretical predictions for the NoINFO and the
INFO treatments (Hypotheses 1-2) and formulate a behavioral conjecture
(Hypothesis 3) based on the literature.18
2.4.1. NoINFO treatment
When depositors cannot observe the action of others, they play a minimal
version of the (simultaneous) coordination problem embedded in Diamond
and Dybvig (1983). We made this setup as close as possible to Diamond and
Dybvig (1983), so depositors do not know neither their position in the line,
nor the decisions of the other depositors when deciding whether to withdraw
in t = 2. There are two equilibria in pure strategies for any possible line, one
where both patient depositors keep their money in the bank (the efficient
equilibrium) and one where both patient depositors withdraw (the bank run
equilibrium).
If patient depositors expect to choose the efficient outcome in t = 2 (in
other words, both patient depositors believe that the other patient depositor
16

In their literature review, Ennis and Keister (2010) describe this feature as follows:
”Suppose, for example, that all of these agents have chosen to withdraw early. Then this
last agent knows that if she chooses to withdraw early, she will receive whatever resources
are left in the bank. If she chooses to wait, however, she will receive the matured value
of these assets in the later period, which is larger. Hence, if she is patient, she is strictly
better off waiting to withdraw.”
17
Our definition of irrational behavior follows from subjects who do not recognize their
dominant strategy in position 3 but we cannot discard the possibility that other features
affect their willingness to withdraw; e.g., subjects can be confused or make errors when
making their choices as depositor 3 in the experiment.
18
For other studies that consider simultaneous or fully sequential decisions see, among
others, Schotter and Yorulmazer (2009) or Kiss et al. (2012, 2018, 2021)
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keeps her funds deposited), there is no incentive to make a costly effort to
arrive early, so a bid of 0 is the optimal strategy in t = 1. If the bank-run
equilibrium is expected to be played in t = 2 (that is, a patient depositor
believes that the other patient depositor withdraws), a patient depositor best
responds by spending some amount of money in the bidding stage in t = 1
to get earlier to the bank than one of the other depositors, so she will bid a
positive amount. More precisely, the patient depositor submits the minimal
amount that she considers necessary to arrive in position 1 or 2 at the bank
and to receive 50 ECUs.
The impatient depositor has no incentive to make costly efforts to arrive
early at the bank if she expects no withdrawals or only one withdrawal from
the patient depositors. If she expects that both patient depositors withdraw,
then the same line of reasoning applies to her as to the patient depositor
who wants to withdraw and expects the other patient depositor to withdraw
as well. Thus, in this case, she will bid the conjectured minimum positive
amount that allows her to arrive early at the bank. In fact, both the patient
and the impatient depositors have the same incentives to arrive early at
the bank if they want to withdraw and expect the other two depositors to
withdraw. Thus, we expect them to bid equally. Therefore, the efforts are
zero or positive depending on the expectations about which equilibrium is
played, the efficient equilibrium or the bank-run equilibrium.
Hypothesis 1 (NoINFO treatment): In the NoINFO treatment, the
effort to arrive early at the bank (i.e., the bids) depends on the expectations
about the occurrence of bank runs. If a patient depositor expects the other
patient depositor to withdraw, then she submits a positive bid to arrive early
(in position 1 or 2) at the bank. If the impatient depositor expects both
patient depositors to withdraw, then she submits a positive bid to arrive early
at the bank. If no bank run is expected, then depositors submit a zero bid.
Conditional on their expectations on the occurrence of bank runs, patient and
impatient depositors do not bid differently.
2.4.2. INFO treatment
As in the general model, there is a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium
without bank run in t = 2 in the three-depositor experimental model, when
depositors have information about the decision of other depositors (Kinateder
and Kiss, 2014; Kiss et al., 2014a). The observability of previous decisions
solves the coordination problem. Depositors have no incentives to make any
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costly effort to arrive early at the bank; i.e., depositors should bid nothing
in the bidding stage, regardless of their liquidity needs.
Hypothesis 2 (INFO treatment and bank runs due to coordination problems): In the INFO treatment, bank runs do not occur due
to a coordination problem among depositors, so both patient and impatient
depositors make no effort to arrive early at the bank (i.e. submit a zero bid).
Although having information on the action of others solves the coordination problem theoretically, Kiss et al. (2018) show that the observation of
withdrawals distorts depositors’ beliefs that a bank run is underway. More
concretely, they find that patient depositors tend to attribute an observed
withdrawal to the other patient depositor instead of the impatient one. As
a result, depositors who observe a withdrawal are likely to withdraw as well
(Garratt and Keister, 2009; Schotter and Yorulmazer, 2009; Kiss et al., 2014a,
2021). Kiss et al. (2018) refer to these bank runs that occur neither because
of fundamental problems nor a coordination issue as panic bank runs. This
behavioral finding suggests a different hypothesis than the previous one. If
depositors believe that a panic bank run can occur in stage 2, then depositors
may make a costly effort in stage 1 to arrive early at the bank.
Hypothesis 3 (INFO treatment and bank runs due to panic behavior): In the INFO treatment, depositors may submit positive bids in
stage 1 of the game to arrive early at the bank if they believe that there will
be a panic bank run.
In principle, the reason for patient depositors to bid in the INFO treatment when a panic bank run is underway is twofold. On the one hand,
patient depositors have incentives to make a costly effort to arrive early at
the bank to keep the money deposited. This way, the other patient depositor
will observe her decision, and this will facilitate the coordination on the efficient outcome. Remember that if the first depositor who acts is impatient,
the observation of withdrawal may result in a (panic) bank run. This idea is
somewhat reminiscent of what Choi et al. (2011) call strategic commitment.
Recent experimental findings show that subjects may be willing to pay to
reveal their types and facilitate coordination on the efficient equilibrium or
outcome (Steiger and Zultan, 2014; Masiliunas, 2017; Kinateder et al., 2020).
A second possibility is to bid and withdraw. This decision is reasonable if
the patient depositor thinks that the other patient depositor will withdraw
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for sure, so the patient depositor receives a guaranteed payoff of 50 ECUs,
rather than 30 ECUs corresponding to keeping the funds deposited alone.
When assessing both options, the patient depositor should find it optimal to
keep her funds deposited whenever she believes that the other patient depositor is rational enough and chooses the efficient outcome upon observing
that somebody has already kept her money in the bank. Otherwise, if she
believes that the other patient depositor is not rational and withdraws even
upon observing that somebody kept her funds deposited, then she is better
off if she withdraws. As for the behavior of the impatient depositors, her
expectation regarding the occurrence of (panic) bank runs is also key to determining whether or not she should make any costly effort to arrive early at
the bank. If the impatient depositor believes that there will be no coordination problems (i.e., both patient depositors will keep their funds deposited),
then she should make no costly effort to arrive early at the bank. If the
impatient depositor expects a (panic) bank run, then she has incentives to
bid a positive amount to arrive early at the bank.
2.5. Individual traits
The previous theory is silent about the magnitude of the bids, but it is
natural to think that the size of the bid is affected by individual traits. In
our experiment, we use a questionnaire to elicit a series of variables that we
believe to be important for bidding behavior.
There is no consensus in the experimental literature on bank runs, on
whether women make different choices than men. Kiss et al. (2014b) and
Shakina (2019) do not find gender differences in the withdrawal decisions,
while Dijk (2017) reports that women are more likely to withdraw when fear
is induced in participants. On the contrary, the experimental evidence on
bidding behavior seems to support the hypothesis that men and women bid
differently; e.g., Rutström (1998) finds that women exhibit more variance
in bidding choices than men do, and Ham and Kagel (2006), Casari et al.
(2007), Chen et al. (2015), Price and Sheremeta (2015), among others, find
that women tend to bid higher in auctions. It is unclear if these results hold
when bidding for a position in a bank-run game, so we test whether gender
affects bidding behavior in our informational environments.
In our experiment, we also elicit risk, loss and ambiguity aversion (see
Appendix C for further details). We expect that the more a depositor dislikes
uncertainty or loss, the more she is willing to pay to avoid it. However, it may
have different effects in the different treatments. In the NoINFO treatment, a
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way to secure a payoff is to be in position 1 or 2 and to withdraw. This leads
to a sure 50 ECUs instead of facing i) the uncertainty of the 70 / 30 ECUs,
or ii) a potential loss if she receives only 30 ECUs and the initial endowment
of 40 ECUs is assumed to be a reference point. Hence, if we consider two
depositors in the NoINFO treatment, both of them expecting that at least
one of the patient depositors withdraws, we conjecture that the one who is
more averse to uncertainty or loss will bid more. As commented before, in
the INFO treatment a patient depositor may want to bid high to be the first
to decide in stage 2 and she may choose to keep her funds deposited. Hence,
she can induce the other patient depositor to do so as well, both of them
earning 70 ECUs (a potential reference point). Thus, here the high bid to
be the first would lead to keeping the money in the bank, in contrast to the
NoINFO treatment. However, in both cases, the more averse a depositor to
uncertainty or loss, the more she bids, ceteris paribus.
We measure the rest of the variables (cognitive abilities, income, trust,
or personality traits) mainly to control for them in the analysis and avoid
confounds.
3. The experiment
3.1. Experimental design and procedures
The experiment consisted of two treatments and ten sessions executed in
a between-subject design. We recruited a total of 312 subjects (156 for the
NoINFO and 156 for the INFO treatment) with no previous experience in
coordination problems or experiments on financial decisions. Each subject
participated in only one treatment. We ran six sessions with 24 subjects each
at the Laboratory for Theoretical and Experimental Economics (LATEX) of
Universidad de Alicante and four sessions with 42 subjects each at the Laboratory for Research in Experimental and Behavioural Economics (LINEEX)
of Universitat de Valencia between October 2015 and February 2016.19
The experiment was programmed using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher,
2007). Instructions were read aloud, and the bank-run game was played
twice. The first time served as a trial so that participants could get familiarized with the game and the software. No results were communicated to
19

We have balanced observations across locations. In particular, we have 72 participants
from Alicante and 84 from Valencia in each treatment. Having detected no significant
differences across locations, we pool the observations.
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the subjects after this trial, nor was there any related payment. The second
play was relevant for the final payment (section Appendix B contains the
instructions).
We employed the strategy method (Brandts and Charness, 2011) and
asked participants to make two different types of choices. The first one
concerned an auction, in which subjects decided what amount of their endowment not deposited in the bank (between 0 and 20 ECUs) to bid for a
position in the line. Subjects were asked to bid both as patient and impatient depositors. It was common information that banks would be formed
by one impatient and two patient depositors, and the first / second / third
depositor in the line would be the depositor who submitted the highest /
second highest / lowest bid.
After their bidding decision, participants were asked to decide what to
do if they arrived at the bank and had the possibility of withdrawing or
keeping their money deposited. Recall that impatient depositors are forced
to withdraw, so we were only interested in the decision of participants in the
role of the patient depositor. In the NoINFO treatment, participants made
their choices without any further information apart from knowing their own
bids as patient depositors. In the INFO treatment, participants were asked
to make a choice in six different scenarios:
• If she arrived first to the bank and did not observe anything.
• If she arrived second and observed that the first depositor had kept her
money deposited.
• If she arrived second and observed that the first depositor had withdrawn.
• If she arrived third and observed that the first depositor had kept her
funds deposited and the second depositor had withdrawn.
• If she arrived third and observed that the first depositor had withdrawn
and the second depositor had kept her funds deposited.
• If she arrived third and observed that the first and the second depositor
had withdrawn.
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By using the strategy method, we obtain a sufficiently large and balanced
number of observations across treatments and positions in the line.20 One
advantage of our design is that we elicit the beliefs of participants regarding
their position in the line, as detailed in section 3.2. This allows us to condition
their choices on their believed position to examine whether the use of the
strategy method has any effect on their decision to withdraw or keep the funds
deposited. By asking participants for decisions in all the information sets
that they could face, we also try to uncover their reasoning and identify their
behavioral type. For example, we know that no depositor 3 would withdraw
if patient because this is a dominated strategy. If a patient depositor in
position 3 withdraws, we can classify that subject as irrational and then
examine whether the bidding behavior of irrational depositors for a position
in the line is different from the behavior of rational depositors who keep their
funds deposited in position 3.
After subjects made their choices in the bank-run game, they filled out a
questionnaire that was used to collect additional information about a set of
socio-economic variables (see Appendix B). In the sessions run in Valencia,
we elicited the participants’ beliefs about their position in the line and the
decision of other depositors, as detailed below. To avoid any wealth effect
that may distort the subjects’ behavior in these subsequent phases, the formation of banks and the realization of payoffs in the bank-run game were
postponed to the end of the experiment.
3.2. Elicitation of beliefs
When subjects completed the questionnaire in our experimental sessions
in Valencia (N = 168 subjects), we elicited their beliefs regarding position
in the line and decisions of the other depositors. More concretely, we asked
in both informational environments (NoINFO and INFO) and for both roles
(impatient and patient depositor) what position they believed to obtain when
20

Although we cannot rule out that the use of this method influences behavior, findings
from a meta-study by Brandts and Charness (2011) suggest that the likelihood for this is
small, as the results may not differ significantly from using the direct-response method,
where participants would be revealed their roles (as patient or impatient depositors) and
then would make one decision depending on their actual position in the line (observing
the action of others in the INFO treatment).
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they submitted their bids.21
We also elicited subjects’ expectations regarding the occurrence of bank
runs in each of the informational environments. To do so, we asked impatient depositors’ belief regarding the behavior of the patient depositors.
More specifically, we asked impatient depositors what they believed about
how many of the other depositors (0, 1 or 2) chose to withdraw. In the
NoINFO treatment, we also asked this question when in the role of the patient depositor. Since the impatient depositor was forced to withdraw, the
possible answers were restricted to 1 and 2. The answer to these questions
allows us to determine whether or not depositors expect a bank run to occur.
Finally, in the INFO treatment we elicited patient depositors’ belief upon
observing a withdrawal in position 2. More concretely, subjects had to decide
which of the following three alternatives was most likely:
1. Depositor 1 who withdrew was the impatient depositor (forced to withdraw).
2. Depositor 1 who withdrew was the one who could choose between keeping the money deposited and withdrawal.
3. The two previous options are equally likely.
Thus, we can assess whether participants attribute an observed withdrawal to the impatient depositor (as predicted by rationality and the coordination explanation of bank runs) or the patient depositor (as suggested by
panic bank runs).22
21

In principle, subjects could bid without thinking about the position in the line. At
the end of the experiment, only 5% of the subjects reported that they did not think about
their position when submitting their bids. We perform a robustness analysis in Appendix
D.2, where we show that our results are robust if we exclude these subjects from the
analysis.
22
We decided to elicit the beliefs of the patient depositor regarding the behavior of
the other patient depositor in the INFO treatment only for the case when observing a
withdrawal. Asking this belief for all information set would have been cumbersome without
much value added as in most of the information set the beliefs must be clear. For instance,
in position 3 when observing all previous decisions the depositor can infer perfectly what
the other patient depositor did. The same is true when a depositor 2 observes that
somebody has kept her funds deposited.
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3.3. Payment to participants
We follow the experimental methodology and pay participants depending
on their actual choices in the experiment. Once the experiment finished, the
computer paired participants randomly to form banks of three depositors and
assigned the role of patient and impatient depositors at random. Payoffs were
computed according to the bidding behavior and the withdrawal decisions of
subjects in the bank-run game (given their role).
Subjects were also paid for their choices in the questionnaire. In particular, we randomly selected one of the three tasks that were used to elicit risk
attitudes, loss aversion and ambiguity.23 At the end of the experiment, the
ECUs earned during the experiment were converted into Euros at the rate 10
ECUs = 1 Euro. The experiment lasted approximately 1 hour. The average
earnings were 10.5 Euros.
4. Experimental results
Our theory builds on the assumption that the observability of actions
should facilitate successful coordination on the no-bank-run outcome in the
INFO treatment. Figure 2 summarizes the beliefs of impatient depositors
regarding the occurrence of a bank run (defined as at least one patient depositor withdrawing) in each of the informational environments. According
to the test of proportion, depositors expect more bank runs in the NoINFO
treatment where they have no information on the decision of other depositors (p < 0.01). Recall that there is a (no) bank-run equilibrium if (none)
both patient depositors withdraw their funds from the bank. We find that
roughly 37% (44%) of depositors expect to see no withdrawals in the NoINFO
(INFO) treatment, while 18% (6%) of depositors expect that both patient
depositors will withdraw in the NoINFO (INFO) treatment, respectively.
Statistically, the Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test rejects the
null hypothesis that depositors expect the same behavior in the two treatments (p = 0.049).
These findings suggests that depositors recognize the importance of observability (Kiss et al., 2014a). Next, we investigate whether (and how) this
23

We also paid subjects if they guessed correctly their performance in the CRT or if
they guessed correctly the number of questions answered correctly by another random
participant.
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NoINFO

INFO

Figure 2: Beliefs on the likelihood of a bank run in each informational environment. The
vertical lines plot the standard errors of each mean.

affects the formation of the line (section 4.1) and the behavior of depositors
in the bank run game (section 4.2).
4.1. Behavior of depositors in the bidding stage
The upper panel of Table 2 summarizes the average bids (with corresponding standard deviations in brackets) for each type of depositor (patient
/ impatient) in each possible treatment (NoINFO / INFO), depending on
the depositors’ beliefs regarding their position in the line. The lower panel
of Table 2 reports the average bid (standard deviation), the median bid, and
the frequency of positive bids for each case.
We observe that depositors who believe to be in position 1 bid more on
average than depositors who believe to be in position 2 or 3. The same holds
for subsequent depositors, that is, depositors who believe to be in position 2
bid more than depositors who believe to be in position 3. The Kruskal-Wallis
test suggests a statistically significant difference in the bidding behavior between the three different expected positions in the line (p-value < 0.0001).
These findings are confirmed by a significant correlation between the depositors’ bid and their expected position in the line (p-value < 0.0001).24 At the
24
We interpret this finding (and the fact that depositors expect less bank runs in the
INFO than in the NoINFO treatment) as evidence that participants understood the basic
features of the underlying games.
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Table 2: Summary of bids unconditional and conditional on the depositors’ belief about
their position. Standard deviations in parentheses.

bottom panel, we find that depositors bid around 7.20 ECUs (roughly 36% of
their endowment) regardless of their role or the informational environment.
Moreover, around 90% of the subjects bid a positive amount to arrive early
at the bank. This result is in sharp contrast with Hypothesis 2 that conjectures that depositors should bid nothing in the INFO treatment. We employ
a between-subject analysis to test whether subjects with the same liquidity
needs behave differently depending on the treatment. Our non-parametric
analysis suggests no differences in bids of patient and impatient depositors
across informational environments (p >0.35).25
A plausible explanation of the high bids in the INFO treatment is related
to the rationality of depositors (Kiss et al., 2016b; Shakina and Angerer,
2018). Rationality can be measured in two ways in the INFO treatment. On
the one hand, depositor 3 has a dominant strategy and should keep the funds
deposited if patient. On the other hand, any patient depositor should keep
her funds deposited in position 2 if she observes that depositor 1 has kept her
funds deposited in the bank. If we use both criteria, 122 out of 156 (78%)
would be classified as rational and 34 (22%) as irrational depositors in the
25

Unless otherwise noted, the reported p-values in this section refer to the MannWhitney-Wilcoxon test for the comparison across treatments. We use the Wilcoxon
signed-rank test for within-subject comparisons; e.g., to test if participants in a particular
treatment submit different bids depending on their liquidity types. We rely on a one-tailed
analysis whenever there is a clear ex-ante hypothesis on the depositors’ behavior.
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INFO treatment. Irrational subjects make more costly efforts than rational
subjects to arrive early at the bank in the INFO treatment, according to
a Mann-Whitney Wilcoxon test (8.81 vs 6.80, p = 0.029).26 This indicates
that the high bids observed in the INFO treatment are partly due to the
irrationality of some depositors.
In order to compare the behavior of rational depositors across informational environments, we eliminate those depositors who believe to be in position 3 in the NoINFO treatment and still withdraw their funds from the
bank (3 out of 156 subjects, 2%). If we eliminate their bids from the analysis, we find that bids by rational (patient) depositors are higher in the
NoINFO treatment than in the INFO treatment (7.61 ECUs vs 6.66 ECUs,
p = 0.046). In the NoINFO treatment, we identify as irrational depositors
those participants who withdraw when they expect no bank run (7 out of 156
subjects, 4%). Our result that bids are higher in the NoINFO than in the
INFO treatment still holds if we eliminate these subjects from the analysis,
although differences are only weakly significant (7.50 ECUs vs 6.66 ECUs,
p = 0.073).27
Finding 1: Irrational depositors make more effort than rational depositors to arrive early at the bank in the INFO treatment. When we focus on
the behavior of rational depositors in the NoINFO and INFO treatments, we
find that bids are higher in the former setting.
Overall, our previous findings show that i) depositors recognize the importance of observability, ii) the large effort (in the form of high bids) in the
INFO treatment can be partially explained because of the irrational behavior
of depositors, and iii) once we constrain the analysis to rational subjects, we
find that there are differences in the bids of depositors in the NoINFO and
the INFO treatments, in line with Hypotheses 1 and 2.
In what follows, we look at the bidding behavior of depositors in each
environment separately. As we will see, the behavior of depositors in the
26

Our previous result that irrational depositors bid more than rational depositors in the
INFO treatment is robust to if we only consider that irrational subjects are the ones who
withdraw in position 3 (27 out of 156, 17%) (8.91 ECUs vs 6.66 ECUs, p = 0.013).
27
While bids by irrational subjects in the INFO treatment are higher than bids by
rational subjects, it seems that rationality does not play a role in the NoINFO treatment;
i.e., bids by rational and irrational subjects are indistinguishable when depositors have no
information on the action of others (p > 0.57).
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NoINFO treatment suggests that depositors are more likely to rush to the
bank if they expect a bank run to occur or if they want to withdraw their
deposit from the bank (see section 4.1.1). As for the INFO treatment, we
show that the high bids are not only due to the irrational behavior of some
depositors, but there is also evidence that depositors expect panic bank runs,
in line with Hypothesis 3. Thus, patient depositors bid to arrive early at the
bank to keep their funds deposited and facilitate coordination on the efficient
equilibrium without bank runs. In contrast, impatient depositors bid higher
when they expect that the two patient depositors will withdraw their deposits
from the bank (see section 4.1.2).
4.1.1. Bidding behavior of depositors in the NoINFO treatment
Hypothesis 1 states that depositors will run in the absence of information about their position and the action of others only if they expect a bank
run. This, in turn, implies that any patient depositor should bid more if she
expects that the other patient depositor will withdraw in the NoINFO treatment. Similarly, the impatient depositor should bid more when she expects
the two patient depositors to withdraw. Figure 3 presents the distribution
of bids in the NoINFO treatment depending on the depositors’ expectations
on the occurrence of bank runs. We observe that whether a patient or impatient depositor submits a positive bid is greatly affected by her expectations
on the occurrence of bank runs. More specifically, we find that the spike at
the zero bid occurs only when depositors expect no bank runs; in fact, any
patient or impatient depositor who expects a bank run always bids a positive
amount to arrive early at the bank. This, in turn, suggests that expectations
on bank runs are important for depositors to decide whether or not to bid
any positive amount to arrive early at the bank (see our econometric analysis
below).28 Hypothesis 1 claims also that patient and impatient depositors will
behave similarly if they expect (no) bank-run. When we condition the analysis on their beliefs regarding bank runs, we find that patient and impatient
depositors do not bid differently (p = 0.18).
Finding 2: Beliefs on the occurrence of bank runs influence depositors’
decision to arrive early at the bank in the NoINFO treatment. In particular,
28

As we show in section 4.2, beliefs on the occurrence of bank runs affect also the
withdrawal decisions; e.g., patient depositors withdraw more frequently if they expect a
bank run compared to when they do not (0.5 vs 0.09). Appendix D.2 provides further
evidence that beliefs are crucial to determine behavior in the NoINFO treatment.
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(b) Bids of impatient depositors
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Figure 3: Bids in the NoINFO treatment depending on the depositors’ expectations on
the occurrence of bank runs.

those who expect a bank run are more likely to submit a positive bid. Conditional on their beliefs on the occurrence of bank runs, patient and impatient
depositors do not bid differently.
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A second feature that we conjecture affects the decision to arrive early at
the bank in the NoINFO treatment is the intention to withdraw. If a patient
depositor plans to keep her funds deposited (believing that there will be no
bank run), she has no incentives to arrive early at the bank. However, if
she wants to withdraw (anticipating a bank run), she should make a costly
effort in the form of a positive bid.29 We find that depositors who keep their
funds deposited are more likely to submit a zero bid than those who withdraw
their funds from the bank (14% vs 4%) (see Figure D.4 in Appendix D for the
distribution of bids). Thus, our data suggest that the withdrawal decision is
important to explain whether or not depositors will make any effort to arrive
early at the bank.
Finding 3: The withdrawal decision does influence the depositors’ decisions to arrive early at the bank in the NoINFO treatment. In particular,
those who want to withdraw their funds from the bank are more likely to
submit a positive bid.
In what follows, we provide the results of our econometric analysis to
understand depositors’ decision in the NoINFO treatment. To accommodate
the features present in the description of the data, we estimate a negative
binomial-logit maximum-likelihood hurdle model, which considers two different data generating processes that can be modeled independently. The
first one (Logit) models the depositor’s decision on whether or not to bid
any positive amount to arrive early at the bank; in particular, the estimates
refer to the likelihood of observing a null bid (or the ”spike” at 0). The second process (Negative-binominal) models the decision on the amount that
depositors bid. As a result, this specification assumes that the factors that
cause depositors to bid might differ from those that cause depositors to de29

In fact, in the NoINFO treatment any patient depositor who keeps her funds deposited
should believe that there will be no bank run, hence the other patient depositor will do
so as well. Thus, patient depositors should withdraw more frequently when they expect a
bank run. This is confirmed by our data (see section 4.2).
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cide how much to bid.30 The results for the patient (impatient) depositor are
presented in Table 3 (Table 4), respectively. Our first regression (1) controls
for risk tolerance, loss and ambiguity aversion. We include the demographic
variables (Age and Gender) in our second regression (2). Our third regression (3) controls for income, trust in institutions and cognitive abilities, while
the fourth regression (4) also includes personality traits (Big Five and Social
Value Orientation).31 In our analysis for patient depositors in Table 3, we
consider a dummy variable (Decision) that takes the value 1 when a depositor
withdraws her / his funds from the bank. We also include a dummy variable
that takes the value 1 if the depositor expects a bank run, i.e., when she expects the other patient depositor to withdraw. In our analysis for impatient
depositors in Table 4 this dummy variable takes the value 1 if she expects
both patient depositors to withdraw.

30

The negative binomial-logit is preferred over the Poisson-logit maximum-likelihood
hurdle model in our setting because there is over-dispersion in our data, as suggested by
the likelihood-ratio test (p < 0.001). Hurdle models have been used to model donations in
dictator games (Brañas-Garza et al., 2017), contribution to public good games (Botelho
et al., 2009) or punishment decisions (Nikiforakis, 2010). See Moffatt (2015) for a general
description of these models, and Cameron and Trivedi (2009) or Hilbe (2011) for further
details on the negative-binominal models and how to estimate them. We acknowledge that
our sample size (e.g., in the NoINFO treatment) may be limited to draw conclusions on
bid amounts, but we still believe the results can provide some insights into the behavior
of depositors that complement our previous results.
31
For simple correlations between bidding behavior and individual traits see Appendix
C. For the results of a negative binomial-logit hurdle model that compares the behavior
of patient and impatient depositors in the NoINFO treatment see Appendix D.2.
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Table 1. Patient depositors in the simultaneous environment

Likelihood of biding nothing (Logit regression)
(1a)
(2a)
(3a)
(4a)
-1.314*
(0.694)
-16.90***
(0.735)
-16.60***
(0.761)
0.269
(0.451)
-0.479
(0.781)
0.013
(0.046)

-2.079
(3.747)
-14.07***
(1.476)
-12.42***
(1.221)
-0.201
(0.536)
0.310
(0.861)
0.052
(0.050)
0.045
(0.181)
-1.453**
(0.663)

-10.72*
(5.895)
-14.60***
(1.089)
-11.32***
(3.021)
-0.257
(0.602)
0.308
(1.175)
0.053
(0.063)
0.035
(0.177)
-2.134**
(1.059)

Controls (income, confidence, CRT)

Yes

Personality (BIG5 and SVO)

Constant
Decision (=1 if withdrawal)
Expect bank run
Risk tolerance
Loss aversion
Ambiguity aversion
Age
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Gender (=1 if female)

Observations

69

-0.707
(3.258)
-14.10***
(0.790)
-12.98***
(1.029)
0.070
(0.469)
0.015
(0.828)
0.034
(0.046)
0.003
(0.167)
-1.489**
(0.650)

69

Amount that depositors bid (Negative binomial)
(1b)
(2b)
(3b)
(4b)
2.343***
(0.164)
-0.249
(0.237)
-0.028
(0.264)
0.221*
(0.134)
-0.478***
(0.186)
0.005
(0.010)

1.634***
(0.576)
-0.352
(0.270)
-0.167
(0.273)
0.105
(0.135)
-0.321*
(0.188)
0.015
(0.009)
0.058**
(0.027)
-0.504***
(0.188)

1.528
(1.386)
-0.350
(0.368)
-0.423*
(0.238)
0.065
(0.123)
-0.262
(0.198)
0.022**
(0.009)
0.052*
(0.029)
-0.620***
(0.205)

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

69

69

69

69

69

1.580***
(0.529)
-0.404*
(0.245)
-0.160
(0.216)
0.114
(0.131)
-0.336*
(0.198)
0.014
(0.0010)
0.054**
(0.026)
-0.502***
(0.190)

69

Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. Significance at the *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 3: Bidding behavior of patient depositors in the NoINFO treatment

Table 3 reveals that subjects in the role of patient depositors are less
likely to bid nothing (i.e., more likely to rush to the bank) when they expect
a bank run to occur (in line with Finding 2) or when they want to withdraw
their deposit from the bank (in line with Finding 3), see columns (1a) to (4a).
Note also that these variables are highly significant even in the presence of
the other variable. However, these variables do not affect the magnitude of
the bids in a significant and consistent way. These findings are in line with
Figures 3 and D.4 (and in turn with Findings 2 and 3) that exhibit a clear
difference in the occurrence of zero bids depending on beliefs of an impending
bank run or the decision to withdraw, but no clear difference if we restrict
our attention to the positive bids.
Finding 4: For patient depositors in the NoINFO treatment, the expectation of a bank run and the decision to withdraw decrease the likelihood of
bidding zero, but do not affect the magnitude of positive bids.
While attitudes towards uncertainty or loss do not seem to influence the
bidding behavior of patient depositors systematically, gender has an intricate effect. In line with previous experimental evidence that females bid
more than males in auctions, our results also indicate that female depositors
are significantly less likely to bid zero compared with male depositors (see
columns (2a) to (4a)), ceteris paribus. If there is a positive bid, however,
female depositors seem to bid less than male depositors (see columns (2b) to
(4b)).
Loss aversion seems to be a determinant of the amount that patient depositors bid, but the effect vanishes as we include additional controls (see
columns (1b) to (4b)). Although this effect was expected, the negative sign
of loss aversion indicates that loss-averse subjects tend to bid less than those
who are not loss-averse. One possible reason is that subjects perceive that
bidding in the NoINFO treatment (where they cannot make visible their
decision to subsequent participants) will not help to foster coordination, so
loss-averse subjects prefer to keep their initial endowment of 20 ECUs rather
than bidding to decide when to go to the bank. Hence, loss-averse subjects
possibly viewed as a loss to spend on bidding, and therefore they bid less.32
This is an interesting finding that suggests that loss-averse subjects are
32

One may argue that some depositors submitted their bids without thinking in the
position in the line (see footnote 21). In our analysis in Appendix C we exclude these
subjects from the analysis, but the finding does not change.
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more willing to keep their funds deposited, than rushing to withdraw. As
for the rest of the control variables, we find that cognitive reflection has a
significant effect on the bidding behavior of patient depositors with regards
to their decision on whether or not to bid; in particular, those who score
higher in the CRT are more likely to bid zero. Our personality measures
(Big Five and Social Value Orientation) are not significantly associated with
the bids of patient depositors.
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Table 2. Impatient depositors in the simultaneous environment
Likelihood of biding nothing (Logit regression)
(1a)
(2a)
(3a)
(4a)
Constant

-16.44***
(0.589)
-14.99***
(0.609)
-0.770
(0.655)
14.99***
(0.598)
-0.008
(0.051)

-17.56**
(6.900)
-15.46***
(1.177)
-1.213
(0.807)
16.68***
(1.190)
0.030
(0.067)
-0.137
(0.439)
-1.611
(2.083)

-612.3***
(24.01)
-49.48***
(3.201)
-11.22
(10.48)
192.4***
(21.46)
-0.713***
(0.083)
6.571***
(1.238)
-35.42***
(5.651)

Controls (income, confidence, CRT)

Yes

Personality (BIG5 and SVO)

Expect bank run
Risk tolerance
Loss aversion
Ambiguity aversion
Age
Gender (=1 if female)

39
Observations

69

-15.14**
(7.670)
-14.96***
(0.696)
-0.861
(0.747)
15.10***
(0.752)
0.023
(0.051)
-0.010
(0.403)
-1.752
(1.133)

69

Amount that depositors bid (Negative binomial)
(1b)
(2b)
(3b)
(4b)
2.331***
(0.148)
-0.0119
(0.136)
0.128
(0.091)
-0.343***
(0.128)
-0.009
(0.007)

2.801***
(0.377)
0.0538
(0.150)
0.0295
(0.070)
-0.127
(0.108)
-0.002
(0.006)
-0.009
(0.017)
-0.477***
(0.106)

2.405**
(0.988)
0.065
(0.162)
0.020
(0.076)
-0.148
(0.123)
-0.001
(0.006)
-0.006
(0.020)
-0.431***
(0.117)

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

69

69

69

69

69

2.816***
(0.352)
0.015
(0.141)
0.083
(0.071)
-0.163
(0.110)
-0.004
(0.007)
-0.016
(0.019)
-0.414***
(0.106)

69

Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. Significance at the *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 4: Bidding behavior of impatient depositors in the NoINFO treatment

When we consider the decision of impatient depositors (who are forced to
withdraw) in Table 4 we confirm that beliefs on the occurrence of bank runs
are key to explaining whether or not they decide to bid (see columns (1a) to
(4a)), that is those who believe that there will be a bank run are significantly
less likely to submit a zero a bid. However, beliefs do not seem to affect the
size of the bid.
Finding 5: In the NoINFO treatment, impatient depositors are less likely
to bid zero if they expect a bank run, but expectations do not affect the size
of the bid.
Again, loss aversion has a negative and significant effect on the bidding
behavior of depositors, but this seems to affect the decision on whether or not
to bid, rather than the amount that depositors bid; in particular, depositors
are more likely to bid nothing in the NoINFO treatment if they are lossaverse. In line with our previous discussion, we also find that females bid
less than males in case of positive bids; so the depositors’ gender affects the
decision on when to arrive at the bank, and females seem to be less panicky.
As for the control variables, there is an effect of cognitive reflection as we
find that a higher score in the CRT increases the likelihood of bidding zero,
while the personality measures have no effect on the bids.
4.1.2. Bidding behavior of depositors in the INFO treatment
We have shown that the rationality of depositors can explain (at least
partially) why they bid in the INFO treatment (see Finding 1). A second
mechanism that we believe to be of great importance when depositors can
observe the action of others is the possibility of panic bank runs (Kiss et al.,
2018; Shakina and Angerer, 2018). Depositors might be perfectly rational
but believe that observing a withdrawal (even if it is due to the impatient
depositor) will induce additional withdrawals.33 This will lead to a bank run
if the impatient depositor decides first and a patient depositor observes the
withdrawal. A way to counteract such behavior is to bid high in order to be
the first in the sequence of decisions, and then to keep the funds deposited to
33

This may be due to the fact that depositors believe that other depositors are not
rational. Or they may believe that other depositors are rational, but those other depositors
may believe that other depositors are not rational and so on. Hence, the lack of common
knowledge of rationality may be behind the withdrawals that we observe in panic bank
runs.
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induce the other patient depositor to do so as well. The previous reasoning
assumes that the other patient depositor will choose her best response upon
observing that another depositor chose to keep her money in the bank. In
our data, subjects who decided to keep the money in the bank in position 1
bid higher than those who decided to withdraw in position 1 (7.54 vs. 5.73,
p = 0.045); in fact, the test of proportion indicates that depositors are more
likely to submit a positive bid if they want to keep their funds deposited in
the bank (90% vs. 79%, p = 0.045). This finding, in turn, suggests that
patient depositors tend to bid high to keep the funds deposited and induce
the other patient depositor to coordinate on the efficient outcome with no
bank runs (see our econometric analysis below for further evidence). We
summarize these results as follows:
Finding 6: Anticipating the possibility of panic bank runs urges some
patient depositors to arrive early at the bank in the INFO treatment. These
depositors keep their funds deposited to (possibly) induce other patient depositors to follow suit.
The behavior of impatient depositors in the INFO treatment is also affected by whether or not they expect a panic bank run to occur. In particular,
none of the depositors bid zero if they expect a bank run in the INFO treatment, so we find that participants are more likely to submit a positive bid
if they expect a bank run, compared with the case in which they do not
expect it. When we look at the average bid of depositors, we also find that
depositors who expect a bank run bid more on average (7.81 ECus vs. 11
ECUs) (see Figure D.5 in Appendix D.1 for the distribution of bids in the
INFO treatment, depending on whether or not impatient depositors expect
a bank run.)
Finding 7: Beliefs on the occurrence of bank runs influence impatient
depositors’ decision to arrive early at the bank in the INFO treatment. In
particular, impatient depositors who expect a bank run are more likely to
submit a positive bid, and tend to bid more than those who expect no bank
run.
We provide further evidence for these findings by using our econometric
approach. We look at the bidding behavior of patient depositors if actions can
be observed in the INFO treatment. The results are summarized in Table 5.
If bank runs are due to coordination problems, depositors should bid nothing
in this environment. However, we have seen that irrational behavior and the
41

desire to signal their intention to keep their funds deposited lead patient
depositors to bid in the INFO treatment. We consider a dummy variable
for irrational depositors that take the value 1 if the subject withdraws in
position 3 in the INFO treatment to account for these factors.34 We also
consider a dummy variable (Decision) that takes the value 1 for a depositor
1 who withdraws her funds from the bank; so this variable indicates whether
a patient depositor will rush to the bank to withdraw (maybe because she
expects that other patient depositor will withdraw, regardless of what she
observes) or she is interested in keeping the money deposited to induce the
other patient depositors to follow suit.
Overall, our econometric analysis supports our previous findings, since
patient depositors who withdraw in position 1 are more likely to bid zero
than those who keep their money in the bank (see Table 5). There is also a
significant effect of rationality in that those who are irrational are less likely
to bid nothing, in line with Finding 3.35 When we look at the behavior of
depositors who bid a positive amount, we find that loss-averse subjects in
the role of patient depositors tend to bid more than subjects who are not
classified as loss-averse (see columns (1b) to (4b)). This result is in line with
the idea that subjects in the INFO treatment want to avoid a bank run and
prefer to bid to show their choice to other depositors. Seemingly, subjects in
the INFO treatment see it as a loss if they fail to coordinate on the efficient
outcome and a way to avoid this failure is to promote coordination actively.
A loss-averse depositor is more likely to keep her funds deposited in position
1 than a depositor who is not loss-averse (31.2% vs. 21.1%). As for the rest
of the control variables, we do not find any significant effect on the behavior
of patient depositors in the INFO treatment.

34

Our results are consistent if we include as irrational subjects also those patient depositors who withdraw upon observing that somebody kept her funds deposited.
35
As we will see in section 4.2, the differences in the withdrawal rates of rational (21.70%)
and irrational (22.22%) subjects is not statistically significant using a test of proportion (p
= 0.953), thus we can conclude that irrational subjects do not tend to bid more because
they are more likely to withdraw in position 1.
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Table 3. Patient depositors in the sequential environment
Likelihood of biding nothing (Logit regression)
(1a)
(2a)
(3a)
(4a)
Constant

-18.02***
(1.315)
0.998*
(0.569)
-15.04***
(0.344)
0.345
(0.375)
0.841
(1.200)
0.002
(0.007)

-17.11***
(2.180)
1.361**
(0.633)
-15.02***
(0.404)
0.545
(0.375)
0.583
(1.232)
0.008
(0.008)
-0.078
(0.071)
-0.660
(0.639)

-14.77***
(3.049)
1.546**
(0.674)
-14.50***
(0.445)
0.507
(0.378)
0.670
(1.239)
0.011
(0.009)
-0.079
(0.076)
-0.499
(0.685)

Controls (income, confidence, CRT)

Yes

Personality (BIG5 and SVO)

Decision (=1 if withdraw)
Irrational depositor
Risk tolerance
Loss aversion
Ambiguity aversion
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Age
Gender (=1 if female)

Observations

144

-15.57***
(2.334)
1.051*
(0.597)
-14.41***
(0.372)
0.543
(0.384)
0.777
(1.257)
0.005
(0.008)
-0.073
(0.080)
-0.501
(0.535)

144

Amount that depositors bid (Negative binomial)
(1b)
(2b)
(3b)
(4b)
1.743***
(0.244)
-0.078
(0.150)
0.137
(0.127)
0.026
(0.100)
0.447**
(0.210)
-0.001
(0.002)

1.754***
(0.345)
-0.00945
(0.156)
0.113
(0.124)
0.0208
(0.094)
0.450**
(0.209)
-0.001
(0.002)
0.004
(0.009)
-0.176
(0.130)

2.330***
(0.669)
-0.0320
(0.152)
0.143
(0.126)
0.0119
(0.102)
0.453**
(0.214)
-0.0004
(0.002)
0.007
(0.009)
-0.158
(0.137)

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

144

144

144

144

144

1.756***
(0.329)
-0.0300
(0.157)
0.123
(0.123)
0.008
(0.094)
0.448**
(0.212)
-0.001
(0.002)
0.004
(0.008)
-0.184
(0.120)

144

Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. Significance at the *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 5: Bidding behavior of patient depositors in the INFO treatment

Finally, Table 6 presents our estimates for the impatient depositors in the
INFO treatment. We find that beliefs on the occurrence of bank runs are
important to explain the behavior of impatient depositors. Our findings also
suggest that risk and loss aversion have a significant effect on the decision
to bid when depositors are forced to withdraw; in particular, depositors are
more (less) likely to bid nothing if they are more risks-tolerant (loss-averse).
These results are intuitive: i) those who tolerate better the risk of lower payoff
due to a bank run spend less on avoiding this possibility; ii) in contrast, lossaverse depositors are eager to expend resources to avoid lower payoff due to
a bank run. In line with our previous discussion, there is an effect of gender
on the bid of depositors, but this effect vanishes as we include additional
controls. Again, demographic characteristics and personality traits show no
significant association with the bids.
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Table 4. Impatient depositors in the sequential environment
Likelihood of biding nothing (Logit regression)
(1a)
(2a)
(3a)
(4a)
-1.619**
(0.664)
-14.31***
(0.856)
0.804**
(0.410)
-1.176**
(0.591)
0.004
(0.007)

0.739
(1.415)
-11.80***
(0.713)
0.919**
(0.398)
-1.612**
(0.691)
0.008
(0.007)
-0.085**
(0.0413)
-0.567
(0.656)

-0.434
(2.770)
-12.27***
(0.874)
0.755**
(0.363)
-1.567**
(0.682)
0.010
(0.008)
-0.080*
(0.042)
-0.361
(0.618)

Controls (income, confidence, CRT)

Yes

Personality (BIG5 and SVO)

Constant
Expect bank run
Risk tolerance
Loss aversion
Ambiguity aversion
Age

45

Gender (=1 if female)

Observations

144

0.352
(1.140)
-13.35***
(0.934)
0.995**
(0.487)
-1.264**
(0.598)
0.007
(0.008)
-0.084*
(0.044)
-0.282
(0.532)

144

Amount that depositors bid (Negative binomial)
(1b)
(2b)
(3b)
(4b)
2.175***
(0.216)
0.390
(0.279)
0.0330
(0.125)
-0.225
(0.190)
-0.002
(0.002)

1.948***
(0.280)
0.518**
(0.249)
-0.0343
(0.0996)
-0.205
(0.182)
-0.001
(0.002)
0.00922
(0.006)
-0.209*
(0.127)

2.775***
(0.611)
0.538*
(0.285)
-0.0268
(0.106)
-0.167
(0.173)
-0.001
(0.002)
0.00965
(0.006)
-0.183
(0.128)

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

144

144

144

144

144

2.120***
(0.267)
0.462*
(0.265)
-0.0446
(0.105)
-0.165
(0.182)
-0.001
(0.002)
0.012*
(0.006)
-0.305***
(0.110)

144

Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. Significance at the *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 6: Bidding behavior of impatient depositors in the INFO treatment

4.2. Behavior of depositors in the bank-run game
While our main interest concerns line formation, we also examine the behavior of depositors in the bank-run game for the sake of completeness. We
report in Table 7 the withdrawal rates of patient depositors in the NoINFO
and the INFO treatments.36 In this section, we also discuss the importance
of beliefs and rationality on the depositors’ behavior. We conclude this section with a sensitivity analysis to show that our results are robust when we
condition depositors’ decision on their expected position in the line. This
would allow us to address potential concerns regarding the use of the strategy method, given that participants in the role of patient depositors were
asked to make a decision for every possible situation in the INFO treatment.
Withdrawal rate
15.4%
50%
9%

NoINFO treatment
Depositor expects a bank run
Depositor expects no bank run
INFO treatment
Depositor 1 (Obs. nothing)
Depositor 2 (Obs. withdrawal)
Depositor 2 (Obs. keeping money in the bank)
Depositor 3 (Obs. a keeping money in the bank and a withdrawal)
Depositor 3 (Obs. two withdrawals)

21.8%
57.7%
5.1%
8.6%
9%

Table 7: Withdrawal rates of patient depositors in each informational treatment.

Table 7 indicates that the withdrawal rate is slightly over 15% in the
NoINFO treatment. Theoretically, beliefs on the occurrence of bank runs
are the key variable to explain the behavior of patient depositors in this environment. Empirically, we find support for this hypothesis; e.g., the test
of proportion suggests that patient depositors are more likely to withdraw
when they expect a bank run compared with the case in which they do not
expect a bank run (50% vs. 9%, p = 0.003). The results are robust if we only
consider in the analysis those depositors who submitted their bids thinking
that this would affect their position in the line (60% vs. 9.2%, p < 0.001).
36

When observing that a depositor kept her funds in the bank and another one withdrew,
we asked participants what they would do if depositor 1 kept the money in the bank and
depositor 2 withdrew and the other way around. As expected, depositor 3 does not react
differently to this information (9% vs. 8.3%, p = 0.808), thus we pool the results (”Obs.
that a depositor kept her funds in the bank and another one withdrew”).
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The likelihood of withdrawal in the NoINFO treatment does not seem to depend on the depositor’s belief regarding her position in the line, according to
the Kruskal-Wallis test (p = 0.89). We undertake an econometric approach
to study the decision to withdraw in the NoINFO treatment using a logit
model (see Table 8). Our econometric analysis confirms that beliefs on the
occurrence of bank runs are key to determining whether or not patient depositors decide to withdraw in the NoINFO treatment. When we control for
individual characteristics, we find that females are less likely to withdraw in
the
NoINFO
treatment
males.
Table 1. Marginal
effects
after logit
regressionthan
for the
withdrawal decision of patient depositors in the simultaneous environment

Expect bank run

(a)

(b)

(c)

(c)

0.217***
(0.118)

0.168***
(0.018)
-0.024
(0.067)
-0.129
(0.081)
0.001
(0.002)

0.177***
(0.016)
-0.038
(0.058)
-0.084
(0.084)
0.003
(0.002)
0.006***
(0.002)
-0.130***
(0.080)

0.199*
(0.110)
-0.001
(0.027)
-0.129***
(0.017)
0.002
(0.003)
0.003**
(0.001)
-0.143***
(0.024)

No

Yes

69

54

Risk tolerance
Loss aversion
Ambiguity aversion
Age
Gender (=1 if female)
Controls (income, confidence, CRT)
Observations

84

69

Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance at the *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

P=0.071for the withdrawal decision (1 if withTable 8: Marginal effects after logistic regression
draws) of patient depositors in the NoINFO treatment.

Finding 8: The expectation of a bank run affects the withdrawal decisions
of patient depositors in the NoINFO treatment in an expected way.
The INFO treatment allows depositors to choose depending on their position in the line and what they have observed from previous depositors.
Theoretically, this should facilitate coordination in that i) any patient depositor should keep her funds deposited, regardless of what she observes,
and ii) any withdrawal from depositor 1 should be assigned to the impatient
depositor. Although we expect no bank runs due to coordination problems
because of these reasons, we find that panic bank runs emerge when choices
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are observable, as reported in Kiss et al. (2018, 2021). We employ a withinsubject analysis to see whether observing withdrawals influence the decision
of patient depositors. In our data, the test of proportion suggests that depositor 2 is more likely to withdraw upon observing a withdrawal than when
she observes that a depositor kept her money in the bank (57.7% vs. 5.1%,
p < 0.001). In addition, depositors believe that withdrawals due to depositor 1 are not always due to the impatient depositor. More concretely, 66%
believe that the withdrawal was due to the patient depositor or any of the
two depositors (the patient and the impatient) with the same probability.
When depositor 2 observes a withdrawal, she tends to withdraw regardless
of whether she believes that the observed withdrawal was due to the patient
or the impatient depositor (test of proportions, p = 0.29), which suggests
that the observation of the withdrawal distorts the beliefs that a bank run is
underway and provokes panic behavior.
One potential concern regarding the behavior of depositors is that we
employ the strategy method, so depositors do not know their actual position in the line when choosing between withdrawing or keeping their funds
deposited; i.e., they make a choice for every possible position. We conduct
a series of robustness checks, and the results still hold. In particular, we
find that depositor 2 is more likely to withdraw upon observing a withdrawal
when we only consider depositors who submitted their bids thinking in their
position (58.5% vs. 5.3%, p < 0.001) or when we focus the analysis on depositors who believe they are in position 2 (54% vs. 2.7%, p < 0.001). These
depositors’ beliefs regarding the withdrawal decision of the depositor 1 is in
line with the one reported above: 64.9% believe that a withdrawal from depositor 1 may be due to the patient depositor or any of the two depositors
(the patient and the impatient) with the same probability.
In line with our previous analysis, we undertake an econometric approach
to study the behavior of depositors in the INFO treatment. Table 9 reports
the results of logit models that examine the behavior of depositors 1 and
depositors 2 who observe a withdrawal. We find no effect of rationality on
the decision of depositor 1. Thus, depositor 1 is not more likely to withdraw
if irrational, although rationality affects her bid to arrive early at the bank.
Our results also suggest gender differences in the behavior of depositor 1 in
that females are more likely to withdraw than males when their actions are
observed. The analysis for depositors 2 replicates Kiss et al. (2018), but we
control for the possibility that subjects are irrational and their beliefs regarding the observed withdrawal (this variable takes the value 1 when depositors
48

assign a positive probability that this was due to the impatient depositor).
As in Kiss et al. (2018), loss aversion seems to be an important determinant of the withdrawal decisions of depositors who observe a withdrawal in
position 2.
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Table 4. Marginal effects after logit regression for the withdrawal decision of depositors in the sequential environment

Irrational depositor

(a)

Depositor 1
(b)

(c)

-0.046
(0.065)

-0.038
(0.070)

0.015
(0.083)

-0.158*
(0.083)
-0.132
(0.098)
0.0004
(0.0004)

-0.135
(0.086)
-0.135
(0.104)
0.0004
(0.0004)
-0.007*
(0.004)
0.104***
(0.023)

-0.092*
(0.051)
-0.085
(0.106)
-0.001***
(0.000)
-0.007*
(0.004)
0.162***
(0.037)

No

Yes

144

144

Beliefs on observed withdrawal
Risk tolerance
Loss aversion
Ambiguity aversion
Age
Gender (=1 if female)

50
Controls (income, confidence, CRT)
Observations

144

Depositor 2 (after observing withdrawal)
(a)
(b)
(c)
-0.120
(0.087)
0.189
(0.183)
-0.213
(0.173)
0.249
(0.172)
0.004
(0.005)

76

-0.106**
(0.053)
0.191
(0.197)
-0.237
(0.191)
0.228**
(0.121)
0.005**
(0.003)
-0.007***
(0.002)
-0.188
(0.117)

-0.108
(0.083)
0.210
(0.237)
-0.190
(0.167)
0.271**
(0.121)
0.008
(0.009)
-0.009***
(0.000)
-0.057
(0.247)

No

Yes

76

76

Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance at the *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 9: Marginal effects after logistic regression for the withdrawal decision of patient depositors in the INFO treatment.

Overall, our findings highlight that expectation of a bank run affects withdrawal decisions in the NoINFO treatment, and these two factors influence
the willingness to arrive early at the bank. In the INFO treatment, depositors
should keep their funds deposited regardless of what they observe, and this
should prevent them from rushing early to the bank. Arguably, we find that
depositors believe that panic bank runs may occur in the INFO treatment.
Depositors react to these beliefs by making costly efforts to arrive early at
the bank; patient depositors rush to keep their funds deposited and facilitate
the coordination on the equilibrium without bank runs, while impatient depositors who expect a panic bank run bid more to arrive early and withdraw
their money from the bank.
5. Discussion and conclusion
This study was motivated by the paucity of theoretical and empirical evidence regarding how lines of depositors form in front of banks. Theoretically,
researchers assume that lines form randomly, reflecting their lack of knowledge about who rushes to the banks. Empirically, it is hard to address this
question. Even if we observe the line, we ignore the liquidity needs of the
depositors and the information they use when choosing whether to withdraw
or not. Covering this gap, we are the first to study the formation of the line
in front of banks to our best knowledge.
To achieve our objective, we propose a model that yields useful hypotheses about line formation, depending on the informational environment. We
hypothesize that when decisions of withdrawing or keeping the money deposited are (fully) observable, we should not observe any bank runs (for any
line that may arise), and as a consequence, no effort is needed to achieve the
first best. In contrast, when these decisions cannot be observed, then beliefs
about the decision of other depositors (that is, the expectation of a bank run
or the lack of it) determine both the efforts made to arrive early at the bank
and the subsequent decisions.
Our theoretical model shows that bank runs may occur as an equilibrium
only if the possible maximum efforts are bounded. If costs to arrive early at
the bank were not limited, strategic behavior would lead to extreme efforts
to arrive early, making such a possibility not profitable. Hence, bank runs
would not occur. This result suggests that, if the possible effort levels are
bounded (for instance, online banking makes depositors’ lives easier), bank
runs may be more likely to occur. This result may have important policy
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implications. For instance, our results rely on a given utility function, so
future research should investigate if our findings hold in other setups with
different utility functions.37
Our experimental results suggest that participants expect fewer bank runs
when they have information about the decision of others, but still they make
costly efforts (in the form of bids) to obtain an early position in the line in
this setting. We observe that irrational behavior and the desire to coordinate
on the efficient equilibrium play a role in explaining the level of effort in
this setting. More precisely, some participants were not fully rational (as
they did not recognize dominant strategies in some information sets), and
irrationality led to higher bids, ceteris paribus. Moreover, we document that
some participants in the role of the patient depositor seemed to make a costly
effort to be the first in the sequence of decision to keep her funds deposited,
thus inducing the other patient depositor to do the same (and prevent a
panic bank run). Possibly, this wish to coordinate with other depositors
(also documented by Kinateder et al. (2020)) by making visible the decision
to keep the funds deposited could be harnessed by banks or regulators.
When considering a wide range of individual traits, we find that loss
aversion plays an important role even if we control for the personality traits
captured by the Big Five and the Social Value Orientation (that do not
affect bids). If depositors have no information on the withdrawal decisions
of others, loss-averse subjects seem to perceive money spent on the bid as
a loss, so they submit significantly lower bids. However, when withdrawal
decisions are observed, loss-averse subjects in the role of patient depositors
submit significantly higher bids, ceteris paribus. This is in line with the
desire to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium. Possibly, subjects as patient
depositors in this setup perceive as a loss if they fail to achieve the highest
payoff related to the no-bank-run outcome, and are willing to make costly
efforts to obtain those payoffs.
Our analysis also suggests that gender affects the willingness to arrive
early at the bank in the absence of information on previous withdrawal deci37

We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out that the utility function
that we use is special in the sense that patient and impatient depositors obtain the same
level of utility from the same consumption in period 1, obfuscating the role of liquidity
shocks for impatient depositors. Assuming higher utility from consumption for impatient
depositors in period 1, or setting a penalty in utility terms for impatient depositors unable
to withdraw are two possibilities to enrich the theoretical model.
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sions in an intricate way, as females are more likely to bid a positive amount,
but bid less than males for a position in the line. When we look at the willingness to withdraw, we find that males tend to withdraw more frequently
than females when their withdrawal decisions cannot be observed, while females are more likely to withdraw than males if their withdrawal decisions
are observed. In line with previous evidence, females and males do not react
differently to panic bank runs (Kiss et al., 2014b).
Our results contribute to the current literature on bank runs on various
fronts. On the theoretical front, we propose a theoretical model that examines the behavior of depositors when they can make an effort to arrive early
at the bank. Our theoretical results also suggest that future attempts to
model the line formation should consider using utility functions that capture
loss aversion. Regarding policy recommendations, our findings indicate that
expectation of a bank run is crucial to line formation. The policy governing financial stability has an important role in affecting these expectations
because if depositors believe that others will not withdraw their funds, they
will not rush to the bank to withdraw early. For instance, a credible deposit
insurance scheme may prevent inefficient bank runs even if the decisions of
other depositors are not observable.
Our study has some limitations as wells. For example, we employ the
strategy method to elicit the bids of patient and impatient depositors. While
we provide evidence that participants seem to understand our game, we cannot rule out the possibility that the experimental design or the confusion
of some subjects influence our findings. In addition, we only considered the
polar cases of observability by looking at the cases in which no previous
choices can be observed and when all previous choices are observable. In
this regard, we followed previous studies that examine simultaneous or fully
sequential decisions in bank-run games (Schotter and Yorulmazer, 2009; Kiss
et al., 2012, 2018, 2021), but real-life situations often lie in between. In particular, some of the previous decisions are observable, while others remain
unobserved. Previous research has found that some structures are conducive
to fewer bank runs than others (Kiss et al., 2014a). There is also evidence
that having information at the aggregate or the individual level is key to
influence behavior; e.g., Kiss et al. (2017) show that citizens will revolt to
overthrow a dictator if they can observe the individual decision of others
(e.g., using of social media), while there is an equilibrium in which citizens
do not revolt if they can only observe the total number of participants in
the mobilization. In bank-run episodes, depositors can receive information
53

on the level of withdrawals at the aggregate or at bank level, but not at the
individual depositor level. We believe that conducting experiments with the
direct method or considering a model of endogenous line formation during
bank runs where depositors have partial information or information at the
aggregate level would be fruitful areas for future research.
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Brañas-Garza, P., Rodrı́guez-Lara, I., Sánchez, A., 2017. Humans expect generosity. Scientific Reports 7, 42446.
Brandts, J., Charness, G., 2011. The strategy versus the direct-response method: a
first survey of experimental comparisons. Experimental Economics 14, 375–398.
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Gráda, C.Ó., White, E.N., 2003. The panics of 1854 and 1857: A view from the
emigrant industrial savings bank. The Journal of Economic History 63, 213–240.

58

Graham, J.R., Harvey, C.R., 2001. The theory and practice of corporate finance:
Evidence from the field. Journal of financial economics 60, 187–243.
Green, E.J., Lin, P., 2000. Diamond and dybvig’s classic theory of financial intermediation: what’s missing? Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly
Review 24, 3–13.
Green, E.J., Lin, P., 2003. Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial
intermediation. Journal of Economic Theory 109, 1–23.
Gu, C., 2011. Herding and bank runs. Journal of Economic Theory 146, 163–188.
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., Zingales, L., 2013. The determinants of attitudes toward
strategic default on mortgages. The Journal of Finance 68, 1473–1515.
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., Zingales, L., 2018. Time varying risk aversion. Journal of
Financial Economics 128, 403–421.
Haigh, M.S., List, J.A., 2005. Do professional traders exhibit myopic loss aversion?
an experimental analysis. The Journal of Finance 60, 523–534.
Halevy, Y., 2007. Ellsberg revisited: An experimental study. Econometrica 75,
503–536.
Ham, J.C., Kagel, J.H., 2006. Gender effects in private value auctions. Economics
Letters 92, 375–382.
Hilbe, J.M., 2011. Negative binomial regression. Cambridge University Press.
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 2.1
Proposition 1
There is always an equilibrium where patient depositors keep their money
deposited, and in this equilibrium nobody makes any effort to go to the bank.
Additionally, there is a bank-run equilibrium where depositors make a positive
effort to arrive early at the bank if and only if the highest possible effort is bounded
and the bound is sufficiently low.
Proof
First, we prove that there is always an equilibrium where patient depositors
keep their money deposited and nobody bids.
1) σ ∗ = (0, 0, 0) is always an equilibrium. Note that if all the depositors choose
those strategies, they obtain the highest possible payment as impatient or patient.
Thus, there are no profitable deviations.
2) σ ∗ = (0, 0, 0) is the only equilibrium where patient depositors keep deposited
the money. Note that if there exists any other equilibrium where patient depositors keep the money deposited, it must include positive bids. However, then any
depositor with a positive bid has a profitable deviation, because bidding 0 reduces
the efforts but maintains the payoff obtained from the bank. Thus, there exists no
equilibrium where patient depositors keep the money deposited, and any depositor
submits a positive bid.
Second, we prove that a bank-run equilibrium where depositors make a positive
effort to arrive early to the bank exists if and only if the highest possible effort is
bounded and the bound is sufficiently low.
Let us define uBR as the expected utility that a depositor obtains in a bank
run when everybody submits the same bid and withdraws in period 1, excluding
the cost of the bid (that is bi ).
h i
int cN∗ u(c∗1 ) + u(clow
1 )
1
uBR =
(A.1)
N
Note that uBR expresses that utility gain of withdrawing early relative to
keeping the money deposited and earning nothing, as we assumed that ui (0) = 0).
There are two possible bank run equilibria (in pure strategies) that may arise:
= (bmax , bmax , 1) and σ ∗ = (0, bmax , 1). In particular, the equilibrium defined
by σ ∗ = (bmax , bmax , 1) is a bank-run equilibrium where patient and impatient
depositors make a positive effort, and it exists if and only if the highest possible
effort is bounded and the bound is sufficiently low.
σ∗
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Next, we prove that those equilibria are the only bank-run equilibria that may
exist. In particular, we prove that:
σ ∗ = (bmax , bmax , 1) is an equilibrium if and only if
• N−

N
c∗1

≥ 1 and bmax ≤ uBR , or

• N−

N
c∗1

∈ (0, 1) and bmax ≤ uBR − u(Rclow
1 ).

σ ∗ = (0, bmax , 1) is an equilibrium if and only if
• p−

N
c∗1

≥ 1 and

 
int cN∗ u(c∗1 )+u(clow
1 )

• p − cN∗ ∈ (0, 1) and
1

1

p+1


int

≤ bmax ≤

 
int cN∗ u(c∗1 )+u(clow
1 )
1

p+1

≤ bmax ≤

N
c∗
1


u(c∗1 )+u(clow
1 )
p

, or

 
int cN∗ u(c∗1 )+u(clow
1 )
1

p

− u(clow
1 ).

The rationale of the proof is as follows: Lemma 1 proves that σ ∗ = (bmax , bmax , 1)
is the only bank-run equilibrium where bids are equal. Lemmas 2 to 4 focus on
equilibria with different bids for each type: Lemma 2 proves that there are no
equilibria where impatient depositors bid strictly more than patient depositors;
Lemma 3 proves that there exist no equilibria where impatient depositors bid
strictly less than patient depositors if the bank has funds enough to pay c∗1 to each
of the patient depositors, i.e., if p ≤ cN∗ ; Lemma 4 proves that, if there exists an
1
equilibrium with different bids for each type, the equilibrium is σ ∗ = (0, bmax , 1);
Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 prove when σ ∗ = (bmax , bmax , 1) and σ ∗ = (0, bmax , 1) are
equilibria, respectively.
Lemma 1: If there is a bank-run equilibrium where patient and impatient
depositors bid the same, such an equilibrium is σ ∗ = (bmax , bmax , 1).
Proof
We prove it by contradiction: Suppose that σ 0 = (b0 , b0 , 1), with b0 < bmax is an
equilibrium. The expected payoff of depositor i in the equilibrium is πi = (σi =
σ 0 ; σj = σ 0 , ∀j 6= i) = uBR − b0 . Note that by increasing the bid, the depositor will
be the first one in the line and therefore she receives from the bank u(c∗1 ). Thus
an  increase in the bid gives a higher payoff to the depositor, and is, therefore, a
profitable deviation. For instance,
πi (σi = (σ 0 + , σ 0 + , 1); σj = σ 0 , ∀j 6= i) = u(c∗1 ) − b0 − ),
u(c∗ )−u

0

(A.2)

with  = min( 1 2 BR , bmax2 −b ) is always a feasible deviation where the depositor increases her payoff. Thus σ 0 = (b0 , b0 , 1), with b0 < bmax cannot be an
equilibrium.
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Lemma 2: There is no bank-run equilibrium where impatient depositors bid
strictly more than patient depositors.
Proof
We prove it by contradiction: Suppose that σ 0 = (bimp , bpat , 1), with bimp > bpat
is an equilibrium. Note that in this case impatient depositors arrive first at
the bank and receive c∗1 . But if an impatient depositor submits a bid between
imp
pat
bimp and bpat (for instance bimp − b −b
), she still arrives at the bank be2
fore impatient depositors, thus receives c∗1 , and is paying less, i.e., πi = (σi =
imp
pat
, bpat , 1); σj = (bimp , bpat , 1), ∀j 6= i)−πi = (σi = (bimp , bpat , 1); σj =
(bimp − b −b
2
imp
pat
(bimp , bpat , 1), ∀j 6= i) = NN−p b −b
> 0, and therefore depositor i has a prof2
itable deviation. Thus σ 0 = (bimp , bpat , 1), with bimp > bpat cannot be an equilibrium.
Lemma 3: If the bank has enough funds to pay c∗1 to all patient depositors,
i.e., if p − cN∗ ≤ 0, then there is no bank-run equilibrium where patient depositors
1
bid strictly more than impatient depositors.
Proof
We prove it by contradiction: Suppose that p − cN∗ ≤ 0 and σ 0 = (bimp , bpat , 1),
1

with bimp < bpat is an equilibrium. Note that in this case, all the patient depositors
arrive at the bank at the same time, followed by the impatient depositors. Since
p − cN∗ ≤ 0, each patient depositor receives c∗1 from the bank. But if a patient
1

pat

imp

depositor submits a bid between bimp and bpat (for instance bpat − b −b
, she
2
still arrives at the bank before impatient depositors, thus receives c∗1 , and is paying
pat
imp
, 1); σj = (bimp , bpat , 1), ∀j 6= i) − πi =
less, i.e., πi = (σi = (bimp , bpat − b −b
2
pat
imp
(σi = (bimp , bpat , 1); σj = (bimp , bpat , 1), ∀j 6= i) = NN−p b −b
> 0, and therefore
2
depositor i has a profitable deviation. Thus, if p − cN∗ ≤ 0, then σ 0 = (bimp , bpat , 1),
with bimp < bpat cannot be an equilibrium.

1

Lemma 4: If there is a bank-run equilibrium where patient and impatient
depositors bid differently, that equilibrium is σ ∗ = (0, bmax , 1).
Proof
Because of Lemma 2, if there is a bank run equilibrium with different bids, it
is σ 0 = (bimp , bpat , 1), with bimp < bpat .
First, we show that bimp = 0. Because of Lemma 3, if σ 0 = (bimp , bpat , 1), with
bimp < bpat is an equilibrium is must be the case that p − cN∗ > 0. Note that in such
1
a case, the patient depositors arrive first at the bank and withdraw all the funds
from the bank (total funds amount to N , and the bank cannot pay pc∗1 ). Thus,
when the impatient depositors contact the bank, there are no funds left, and they
receive nothing from the bank. Therefore, if impatient depositors submit a positive
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bid, they have a profitable deviation by bidding 0. Thus, if σ 0 = (bimp , bpat , 1),
with bimp < bpat is an equilibrium, then it must be σ 0 = (0, bpat , 1), with 0 < bpat .
Second, we show that bpat = bmax , by contradiction. Suppose that p − cN∗ > 0
1
and that σ 0 = (0, bpat , 1), with 0 < bpat < bmax is an equilibrium. Note that
the expected payment from the bank of a patient depositor in the equilibrium
σ 0 = (bimp , bpat , 1), with bimp < bpat , is strictly lower than c∗1 , because it is
πi (σi = (0, bpat , 1); σj = (0, bpat , 1), ∀j 6= i) =
h i


N
∗ ) + u(clow )
int
u(c
∗
1
1
c1
p 
− bpat  .
=
N
p

(A.3)

But note that given that bpat < bmax , there is a feasible profitable deviation if
the depositor bids slightly more when patient, because in that case she arrives at
the bank in the first position and receives c∗1 with probability 1. For instance, it
is feasible with the bid
 
int cN∗ u(c∗1 )+u(clow
1 )

∗

1

bmax − bpat u(c1 ) −
p
,
2
2
Note that it is a feasible bid for a patient depositor and that
b0 = bpat + min(



).

(A.4)

πi (σi = (0, b0 , 1); σj = (0, bpat , 1), ∀j 6= i) =

 

u(c∗1 ) −

p  ∗
p 
 ∗
0
pat
=
u(c1 ) − b ≥
u(c ) − b −
N
N 1

=

p
N



 u(c∗ ) −
1





p 
>
N

int

int

N
c∗
1

int

N
c∗
1

u(c∗1 )+u(clow
1 )
p

2


u(c∗1 )+u(clow
1 )
p

2

h i
N
c∗1

u(c∗1 ) + u(clow
1 )
p



=




− bpat  >


(A.5)


− bpat  =

πi (σi = (0, bpat , 1); σj = (0, bpat , 1), ∀j 6= i).
Thus, if σ 0 = (0, bpat , 1), with 0 < bpat is an equilibrium, then bpat cannot be
lower than bmax . The previous arguments prove that, if there is a bank-run equi-
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librium where patient and impatient depositors bid differently, that equilibrium is
σ ∗ = (0, bmax , 1).
Lemma 5: σ ∗ = (bmax , bmax , 1) is an equilibrium if and only if
• N−

N
c∗1

≥ 1 and bmax ≤ uBR , or

• N−

N
c∗1

∈ (0, 1) and bmax ≤ uBR − u(Rclow
1 )

Proof
We prove, first, that if N −

N
c∗1

≥ 1 and bmax ≤ uBR , then σ ∗ = (bmax , bmax , 1)

is an equilibrium; second, that if N −

N
c∗1

≥ 1 and bmax > uBR , then σ ∗ =

(bmax , bmax , 1) is not an equilibrium; third, that if N −

N
c∗1

∈ (0, 1) and bmax ≤

∗
uBR − u(Rclow
1 ), then σ = (bmax , bmax , 1) is an equilibrium; and fourth, that if
N
∗
N − c∗ ∈ (0, 1) and bmax > uBR − u(Rclow
1 ), then σ = (bmax , bmax , 1) is not an
1
equilibrium. Note that if all the depositors choose σ ∗ = (bmax , bmax , 1), the expected payoff of depositor i is πi (σi = (bmax , bmax , 1); σj = (bmax , bmax , 1), ∀j 6=
i) = uBR − bmax .
First, suppose that N − cN∗ ≥ 1 and bmax ≤ uBR and that all depositors choose
1

σ ∗ = (bmax , bmax , 1). Given that N − cN∗ ≥ 1, the last depositor in the line receives
1
0 from the bank. Submitting a bid less than bmax , the depositor arrives last
and receives zero payoff, so a bid equal to 0 dominates any bid lower than bmax .
Possible optimal deviations would be therefore (0, bmax , 1), (bmax , 0, 1) or (0, 0, 1).
However, note that for (0, bmax , 1)
πi (σi = (0, bmax , 1); σj = (bmax , bmax , 1), ∀j 6= i) =
p
=
[uBR − bmax ] ≤
N
≤ [uBR − bmax ] =

(A.6)

= πi (σi = (bmax , bmax , 1); σj = (bmax , bmax , 1), ∀j 6= i).
Similarly, for (bmax , 0, 1)
πi (σi = (bmax , 0, 1); σj = (bmax , bmax , 1), ∀j 6= i) =
N −p
=
[uBR − bmax ] ≤
N
≤ [uBR − bmax ] =
= πi (σi = (bmax , bmax , 1); σj = (bmax , bmax , 1), ∀j 6= i).
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(A.7)

Similarly, for (0, 0, 1)
πi (σi = (bmax , 0, 0); σj = (bmax , bmax , 1), ∀j 6= i) ≤
≤ [uBR − bmax ] =

(A.8)

= πi (σi = (bmax , bmax , 1); σj = (bmax , bmax , 1), ∀j 6= i)
Thus, there is no profitable deviation, and σ ∗ = (bmax , bmax , 1) is an equilibrium.
Second, suppose that N − cN∗ ≥ 1 and bmax > uBR (note that this condition
1
is the opposite of what we had in the previous paragraph) and that all depositors
choose σ ∗ = (bmax , bmax , 1). Given that N − cN∗ ≥ 1, the last depositor in the line
1
receives 0 from the bank. We show that bidding 0 as impatient is a profitable
deviation (it would also be a profitable deviation bidding 0 as patient):
πi (σi = (0, bmax , 1); σj = (bmax , bmax , 1), ∀j 6= i) =
p
=
[uBR − bmax ] >
N
> [uBR − bmax ] =

(A.9)

= πi (σi = (bmax , bmax , 1); σj = (bmax , bmax , 1), ∀j 6= i).
Thus, there is a profitable deviation, and σ ∗ = (bmax , bmax , 1) is not an equilibrium.
Third, suppose that N − cN∗ ∈ (0, 1) and bmax ≤ uBR − u(Rclow
1 ) and that
1

all depositors choose σ ∗ = (bmax , bmax , 1). Given that N −

N
c∗1

∈ (0, 1), the last

depositor in the line receives clow
> 0 from the bank. Submitting a bid less
1
than bmax implies that the depositor arrives last and receives that payoff. Thus
a bid equal to 0 dominates any bid lower than bmax . Moreover, note that if the
depositor is patient and the last one in the line, keeping the deposit in the bank
dominates withdrawal, because in such case the funds in the bank are increased
by the interest rate. Possible optimal deviations would be therefore (0, bmax , 1),
(bmax , 0, 0) or (0, 0, 0). However, note that for (0, bmax , 1)
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πi (σi = (0, bmax , 1); σj = (bmax , bmax , 1), ∀j 6= i) =
p
N −p
u(clow
[uBR − bmax ] <
=
1 )+
N
N
N −p
p
<
u(Rclow
[uBR − bmax ] ≤
1 )+
N
N
N −p
p
≤
[uBR − bmax ] +
[uBR − bmax ] =
N
N
= [uBR − bmax ] =

(A.10)

= πi (σi = (bmax , bmax , 1); σj = (bmax , bmax , 1), ∀j 6= i)
Similarly, for (bmax , 0, 0)
πi (σi = (bmax , 0, 0); σj = (bmax , bmax , 1), ∀j 6= i) =
p
N −p
[uBR − bmax ] + u(Rclow
=
1 )≤
N
N
N −p
p
≤
[uBR − bmax ] +
[uBR − bmax ] =
N
N
= [uBR − bmax ] =

(A.11)

= πi (σi = (bmax , bmax , 1); σj = (bmax , bmax , 1), ∀j 6= i)
Similarly, for (0, 0, 0)
πi (σi = (0, 0, 0); σj = (bmax , bmax , 1), ∀j 6= i) =
N −p
p
=
u(clow
u(Rclow
1 )+
1 )<
N
N
N −p
p
<
u(Rclow
u(Rclow
1 )+
1 )=
N
N
= u(Rclow
1 )≤

(A.12)

≤ [uBR − bmax ] =
= πi (σi = (bmax , bmax , 1); σj = (bmax , bmax , 1), ∀j 6= i)
Thus, there is no profitable deviation, and σ ∗ = (bmax , bmax , 1) is an equilibrium.
Fourth, suppose that N − cN∗ ∈ (0, 1) and bmax > uBR − u(Rclow
1 ) (note that
1
this condition is the opposite of what we had in the previous paragraph) and that
all depositors choose σ ∗ = (bmax , bmax , 1). Given that N − cN∗ ∈ (0, 1), the last
1
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depositor in the line receives clow
1 from the bank. We show that bidding 0 as patient
and withdrawing the deposit is a profitable deviation:
πi (σi = (bmax , 0, 0); σj = (bmax , bmax , 1), ∀j 6= i) =
N −p
p
=
[uBR − bmax ] + u(Rclow
1 )>
N
N
p
N −p
[uBR − bmax ] +
[uBR − bmax ] =
>
N
N
= [uBR − bmax ] =

(A.13)

= πi (σi = (bmax , bmax , 1); σj = (bmax , bmax , 1), ∀j 6= i)
Thus, there is a profitable deviation and σ ∗ = (bmax , bmax , 1)∗ is not an equilibrium.
Lemma 6: σ ∗ = (0, bmax , 1) is an equilibrium if and only if

• p−
• p−

N
c∗1

N
c∗1

≥ 1 and

 
int cN∗ u(c∗1 )+u(clow
1 )

∈ (0, 1) and


int

1
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p+1

 
int cN∗ u(c∗1 )+u(clow
1 )
1

p+1

≤ bmax ≤

N
c∗
1


u(c∗1 )+u(clow
1 )
p

, or

 
int cN∗ u(c∗1 )+u(clow
1 )
1

p

− u(clow
1 )

Proof
We prove, first, that if p− cN∗ ≥ 1 and

 
int cN∗ u(c∗1 )+u(clow
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int
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p+1

1

p

N
∗
int c∗ u(c1 )+u(clow
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1

bmax , then σ ∗ = (0, bmax , 1) is not an equilibrium; third, that if p −
bmax >

1

p

that if p −

N
c∗1

 
int cN∗ u(c∗1 )+u(clow
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p+1

p+1
N
c∗1

≥ 1 and

1

p+1

≤ bmax ≤

 
int cN∗ u(c∗1 )+u(clow
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1

∗
u(clow
1 ), then σ = (0, bmax , 1) is an equilibrium; fifth, that if p −
1

1

, then σ ∗ = (0, bmax , 1) is not an equilibrium; fourth,

∈ (0, 1) and
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u(c∗1 )+u(clow
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then σ ∗ = (0, bmax , 1) is an equilibrium; second, that if p− cN∗ ≥ 1 and
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if p − cN∗ ∈ (0, 1) and bmax >
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1 ), then σ = (0, bmax , 1)
p
1
is not an equilibrium. Note that if all the depositors choose σ ∗ = (0, bmax , 1),
the expected payoff of depositor i is πi (σi = (0, bmax , 1); σj = (0, bmax , 1), ∀j 6=
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>

i) = uBR − Np bmax . This is the case because although with this strategy patient
depositors arrive first and impatient depositors arrive later, since all depositors
act symmetrically, their expected payoff is the same as in the bank-run situation
where all of them arrive at the same time.
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and that all depositors choose σ ∗ = (0, bmax , 1). Given that p − cN∗ ≥ 1, the im1
patient depositors and at least one patient depositor receive 0 from the bank. Increasing the bid when impatient could only be profitable if the bid is high enough
to get some payoff from the bank, i.e., if the impatient depositor bids bmax . For
a patient depositor, making any bid less than bmax implies not receiving anything
from the bank, so a bid equal to 0 dominates any bid lower than bmax . Possible
optimal deviations would be therefore (bmax , bmax , 1) or (0, 0, 1). However, note
that for (bmax , bmax , 1)
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p
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N
= πi (σi = (0, bmax , 1); σj = (0, bmax , 1), ∀j 6= i)
= uBR −




Note that the inequality holds because
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Similarly, for (0, 0, 1)
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= πi (σi = (0, bmax , 1); σj = (0, bmax , 1), ∀j 6= i)
= uBR −

Thus, there is no profitable deviation, and σ ∗ = (0, bmax , 1) is an equilibrium.
Second, suppose that p −
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all depositors choose σ ∗ = (0, bmax , 1). Given that p − cN∗ ≥ 1, the last patient
1
depositor in the line receives 0 from the bank. We show that bidding bmax as
impatient is a profitable deviation.
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p
bmax =
N
= πi (σi = (0, bmax , 1); σj = (0, bmax , 1), ∀j 6= i)
= uBR −

Thus, there is a profitable deviation and σ ∗ = (0, bmax
, 1) is not an equilibrium.
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, and that all

depositors choose
= (0, bmax , 1). Given that p −
≥ 1, the last patient
depositor in the line receives 0 from the bank. We show that bidding 0 as patient
is a profitable deviation.
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= πi (σi = (0, bmax , 1); σj = (0, bmax , 1), ∀j 6= i)
= uBR −

Thus, there is a profitable deviation and σ∗ = (0, bmax , 1) is not an equilibrium.
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the last patient depositor in the line receives clow
> 0 from the bank. For an im1
patient depositor, the only possibly profitable deviation is to increase the bid, and
it could be profitable only if she is able to obtain some payoff from the bank, i.e.,
if she bids bmax . For a patient depositor, making a bid lower than bmax but higher
than 0, she arrives last at the bank and receives clow
> 0. Thus, any positive bid
1
when patient is dominated by a lower bid that remains higher than 0. Therefore,
a possible optimal deviation would be (bmax , bmax , 1). The other possibility that
we need to check is lim→0+ σ = (0, , 1).
For (bmax , bmax , 1), we have
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Similarly, for (0, , 1)
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Thus, there is no profitable deviation, and σ ∗ = (0, bmax , 1) is an equilibrium.
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Thus, there is a profitable deviation and σ ∗ = (0, bmax
, 1) is not an equilibrium.
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= uBR −

Thus, there is a profitable deviation and σ ∗ = (0, bmax , 1) is not an equilibrium.

Overall, we have shown that in the NoINFO setup, there are three equilibria.
In the no-run equilibrium, no depositor withdraws, and each depositor submits a
zero bid (that is, makes no effort to arrive early at the bank). In the full-fledged
bank-run equilibrium, all depositors withdraw and submit the maximum bid. In
the partial run equilibrium, only patient depositors submit the maximum bid to
arrive early at the bank. The main result is that there are multiple equilibria in
the NoINFO setup.
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Appendix B. Instructions
Here we reproduce the instructions, translated from Spanish.
Simultaneous treatment
Welcome to this experiment!
In this experiment, we study how individuals solve decision-making problems, and
we are not interested in your particular decision, but the average behavior of
individuals. That is why you will be treated anonymously during the experiment,
and nobody in this room will ever know the decisions you make.
Next, you will see the instructions that explain how the experiment goes. These
instructions are the same for all participants, and it is of utmost importance that
you understand them well because your earnings will depend to a large extent on
your decisions.
At the end of the experiment, we will ask you to complete a long questionnaire
that contains several games that allow you to earn extra money. The objective
of the questionnaire is to get to know your tastes and preferences (that are not
obviously the same as those of the rest of the participants), and, for this reason,
there are no correct answers to the questions that we raise. During the questionnaire, it is important that you state your preferred option in each case because
your earnings from the questionnaire depend to a large degree on your decisions.
Remember that all the decisions you make during the experiment are anonymous and will not be linked to you. If you have any doubts or questions during
the experiment, raise your hand, and we will come to you. Remember also that
you are not allowed to speak during the experiment.
What is the experiment about?
At the beginning of the experiment you will receive 60 ECUs:
• Part of the money (20 ECUs) is your initial endowment.
• The rest of the money (40 ECUs) is deposited in a bank.
The bank where your money is deposited is composed of three depositors who
are in the lab. Thus, the bank has a total capital of 120 ECUs (40 ECUs from
each depositor).
How can you earn money in this experiment?
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In each bank, one of the depositors is chosen randomly, and she will be forced
to withdraw her deposit. The rest of the depositors may decide if they withdraw
their funds from the bank or keep them deposited until the bank carries out a
project. In any case, your earnings will depend not only on your decision, but also
on how the other depositors of your bank have decided. Moreover, the position in
the line may affect your earnings as we explain next.
Position in the line
To determine the sequence in which depositors make their decision, we carry
out an auction. Each depositor of the bank (the one that will be forced to withdraw
and those who can choose whether to keep their money deposited or withdraw it)
can submit a bid from her initial endowment (0, 1, 2, ..., 20 ECUs) that determines
her position in the line. The depositor with the highest bid will be the first in the
line, the one with the intermediate bid will be the second, and the depositor with
the lowest bid will be the third. If there is a tie in the bids, the positions will be
determined randomly. The amount of money used for bidding is deducted from
your initial endowment of 20 ECUs. You will receive the amount not used for
bidding at the end of the experiment as part of your earnings.
What happens if you withdraw your deposit?
The depositor who is forced to withdraw or any other depositor
who chooses to withdraw will receive 50 ECUs whenever the bank has
enough funds to pay that amount. Therefore, if you are the first or the
second depositor in the sequence of decisions, and you choose to withdraw (or you
are forced to do so), then you earn 50 ECUs (this amount corresponds to your
initial deposit of 40 ECUs + 10 ECUs in the form of interests earned). If you are
the third depositor in the line, and you choose to withdraw (or you are forced to
do so), then your earnings depend on what the other two depositors before you
have decided:
• If only one of the previous two depositors (or none of them) chose to withdraw, then you also receive 50 ECUs, because the bank has no problems
paying that amount.
• If both of the depositors who have decided before you chose to withdraw,
then your earnings amount to 20 ECUs (the amount of money that the bank
has after two withdrawals).
To sum up,
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What happens if you keep your money deposited?
After paying the depositors who chose to withdraw, the bank carries out a
project and pays a dividend to those depositors who decided to keep their funds
in the bank.
• If two depositors choose to keep their funds deposited, then each of them
earns 70 ECUs, independently of their position in the line.
• If one depositor chooses to keep her funds deposited, she earns 30 ECUs, independently of her position in the line.
To sum up,

As you see, not all three depositors of the same bank may decide to keep their
funds deposited. This is the case because in each bank there will be a depositor

78

who will be forced to withdraw her funds. This depositor (as the others) can
submit her bid that determines her position in the line, but she cannot choose
between keeping the money deposited or withdrawing.
How many decisions do I have to make in this experiment?
In this experiment, we ask you to submit a bid as a depositor forced to withdraw and also as one who can choose between keeping her funds deposited or
withdrawing. In both cases, you may submit a bid from your initial endowment
(between 0 and 20 ECUs). Furthermore, we ask you to tell us what decisions (to
withdraw or to keep your funds deposited) you would make as a depositor who
can decide whether to withdraw or keep her money in the bank.
In this experiment, you do not know anything about the bids and the decisions
(to withdraw or keep the funds deposited) of the other depositors of your bank.
You do not even know your position in the line (which depends on your bid and
the bids of the other depositors of your bank). Keeping in mind this information,
we ask you what you would do with your deposit (keep it in the bank or withdraw
it).
What information will I have in this experiment?
Next, we show you one of the screens of the experiment so that you can see
the way that we provide you the information.
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(The Spanish text is the following: Period 1 of 1, Time (seconds):
We completed the auction, your bid was 0. Remember that you will be the
first, the second or the third in the line, depending on how your bid was relative
to the bids of the others. Please, decide now if you want to keep your money in
the bank or you want to withdraw. We remind you that one of the other two
depositors will surely withdraw (and she submitted her bid knowing this), and the
other will choose between keeping her money in the bank and withdrawing (and
she submitted her bid knowing this).
Remember also your payoff related to keeping your funds deposited and to
withdrawal in this stage:
• If you withdraw, then your payoff may be 20 ECUs (if you are the third
depositor in the line, and the previous two depositors have withdrawn) or
50 ECUs if at least one of the other depositors keeps her funds deposited.
• If you keep your money deposited, then your payoff will be 70 ECUs (if the
other depositor who can also keep her funds deposited does so) or 30 ECUs
(if you are the only one who keeps her funds deposited).
Remember that one of the other depositors will be forced to withdraw, and
the other one has to choose whether to withdraw her money or not, like you.
(Red buttons:) Keep the deposit in the bank
Withdraw the deposit from the bank
(In the Picture the text below the first / second / third person is High /
Intermediate / Low bid.))
Note that in the upper panel, we remind you of your bid, and we tell you
that you are one of the depositors who can choose between keeping her funds in
the bank and withdrawing. On the right-hand side of the picture, you see the
three depositors of the bank, ranked according to their bids (that you do not
know). On the left-hand side of the picture, we remind you of your payoffs related
to withdrawal and keeping the money deposited. Your decision can be made by
clicking the corresponding button in the lower panel.
What determines your final earnings?
At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly choose one of the
three depositors of the bank to be the depositor forced to withdraw. The other
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two will be the depositors who can choose between keeping their funds in the bank
and withdrawing. All depositors have the same probability of being chosen as the
depositor forced to withdraw.
Once the depositor forced to withdraw is selected, the computer uses the submitted bids to determine the sequence of decisions and deducts the bids from the
initial endowments of 20 ECUs. Next, the computer tells the decision of each
depositor as a function of the decisions given for all possibilities.
If you are the depositor forced to withdraw, we deduct from your initial endowment of 20 ECUs your bid submitted as the forced depositor. And you will
earn a payoff depending on your position in the line and the decision of the other
depositors:

In case that you are a depositor who can choose between keeping her funds in
the bank and withdrawing, we deduct from your initial endowment of 20 ECUs
your bid submitted as a depositor who can choose between keeping the money in
the bank and withdrawal. And you will earn a payoff depending on your position
in the line and the decision of the other depositors:

At the end of the experiment, you will receive your earnings in Euros (10 ECUs
= 1 Euro).
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Next, we provide some examples so that you can see how the payoffs are calculated. Before starting the experiment, there will be a trial round where you will
be able to see the decision screens for the bidding and the decision of whether to
withdraw or keep the money deposited. This trial round will not affect your final
payoff. We will call your attention when the phase that determines your payoff
begins.
Thanks for participating!
Example 1
Imagine depositors A, B and C and assume that the computer selects B as the
depositor forced to withdraw. Here are the bids:

These are then the bids that determine the position:
Bid of depositor A: 5 ECUs
Bid of depositor B: 6 ECUs
Bid of depositor C: 10 ECUs
Therefore, depositor C will be the first, depositor B the second and depositor
A the third in the line. These bids will be deducted from the initial endowment,
so from there depositor A will receive 15 ECUs, depositor B will receive 14 ECUs,
and depositor C will have 10 ECUs. This amount will add to the earnings related
to withdrawing or keeping the funds deposited.
For instance, assume the following decisions (ranked according to the sequence
of decision)
1. - Depositor C: Keep the money deposited
2. - Depositor B: Withdraw (Forced)
3. - Depositor A: Keep the money deposited
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Depositor C and A will receive 70 ECUs, and depositor B receives 50 ECUs
for their decisions.
These earnings add to the earnings resulting from the bid, so depositor A
receives a total of 85 ECUs (15 initial endowment + 70 decision), depositor B
receives a total of 64 ECUs (14 initial endowment + 50 decision), depositor C
receives a total of 80 ECUs (10 initial endowment + 70 decision).
Now assume the following decisions:
1. - Depositor C: Withdraw
2. - Depositor B: Withdraw (Forced)
3. - Depositor A: Keep the money deposited
Then depositor C and B will receive 50 ECUs and depositor A receives 30
ECUs for their decisions.
These earnings add to the earnings resulting from the bid, so depositor A
receives a total of 45 ECUs (15 initial endowment + 30 decision), depositor B
receives a total of 64 ECUs (14 initial endowment + 50 decision), depositor C
receives a total of 60 ECUs (10 initial endowment + 50 decision).
Assume the following decisions:
1. - Depositor C: Withdraw
2. - Depositor B: Withdraw (Forced)
3. - Depositor A: Withdraw
Then depositor C and B will receive 50 ECUs, and depositor A receives 20
ECUs for their decisions.
These earnings add to the earnings resulting from the bid, so depositor A
receives a total of 35 ECUs (15 initial endowment + 20 decision), depositor B
receives a total of 64 ECUs (14 initial endowment + 50 decision), depositor C
receives a total of 60 ECUs (10 initial endowment + 50 decision).

Example 2
Imagine depositors A, B and C, and assume that the computer selects C as
the depositor forced to withdraw. Here are the bids:
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These are then the bids that determine the position:
Bid of depositor A: 5 ECUs
Bid of depositor B: 3 ECUs
Bid of depositor C: 1 ECUs
Therefore, depositor A will be the first, depositor B the second, and depositor
C the third in the line. These bids will be deducted from the initial endowment,
so from there depositor A will receive 15 ECUs, depositor B will receive 17 ECUs,
and depositor C will have 19 ECUs. This amount will add to the earnings related
to withdrawing or keeping the funds deposited.
For instance, assume the following decisions (ranked according to the sequence
of decision)
1. - Depositor A: Keep the money deposited
2. - Depositor B: Withdraw
3. - Depositor C: Withdraw (Forced)
Then depositor B and C will receive 50 ECUs, and depositor A receives 30
ECUs for their decisions. These earnings add to the earnings resulting from the bid,
so depositor A receives a total of 45 ECUs (15 initial endowment + 30 decision),
depositor B receives a total of 67 ECUs (17 initial endowment + 50 decision),
depositor C receives a total of 69 ECUs (19 initial endowment + 50 decision).
Assume the following decisions
1. - Depositor A: Keep the money deposited
2. - Depositor B: Keep the money deposited
3. - Depositor C: Withdraw (Forced)
Then depositor A and B will receive 70 ECUs, and depositor C receives 50
ECUs for their decisions. These earnings add to the earnings resulting from the bid,
so depositor A receives a total of 85 ECUs (15 initial endowment + 70 decision),
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depositor B receives a total of 87 ECUs (17 initial endowment + 70 decision),
depositor C receives a total of 69 ECUs (19 initial endowment + 50 decision).
Assume the following decisions
1. - Depositor A: Withdraw
2. - Depositor B: Withdraw
3. - Depositor C: Withdraw (Forced)
Then depositor A and B will receive 50 ECUs, and depositor C receives 20
ECUs for their decisions. These earnings add to the earnings resulting from the bid,
so depositor A receives a total of 65 ECUs (15 initial endowment + 50 decision),
depositor B receives a total of 67 ECUs (17 initial endowment + 50 decision),
depositor C receives a total of 39 ECUs (19 initial endowment + 20 decision).
Sequential treatment
Welcome to this experiment!
In this experiment, we study how individuals solve decision-making problems, and
we are not interested in your particular decision, but the average behavior of
individuals. That is why you will be treated anonymously during the experiment,
and nobody in this room will ever know the decisions you make.
Next, you will see the instructions that explain how the experiment goes. These
instructions are the same for all participants, and it is of utmost importance that
you understand them well because your earnings will depend to a large extent on
your decisions.
At the end of the experiment, we will ask you to complete a long questionnaire
that contains several games that allow you to earn extra money. The objective
of the questionnaire is to get to know your tastes and preferences (that are not
obviously the same as those of the rest of the participants), and, for this reason,
there are no correct answers to the questions that we raise. During the questionnaire, it is important that you state your preferred option in each case because
your earnings from the questionnaire depend to a large degree on your decisions.
Remember that all the decisions you make during the experiment are anonymous and will not be linked to you. If you have any doubts or questions during
the experiment, raise your hand, and we will come to you. Remember also that
you are not allowed to speak during the experiment.
What is the experiment about?
At the beginning of the experiment you will receive 60 ECUs:
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• Part of the money (20 ECUs) is your initial endowment.
• The rest of the money (40 ECUs) is deposited in a bank.
The bank where your money is deposited is composed of three depositors who
are in the lab. Thus, the bank has a total capital of 120 ECUs (40 ECUs from
each depositor).
How can you earn money in this experiment?
In each bank, one of the depositors is chosen randomly, and she will be forced
to withdraw her deposit. The rest of the depositors may decide if they withdraw
their funds from the bank or keep them deposited until the bank carries out a
project. In any case, your earnings will depend not only on your decision, but also
on how the other depositors of your bank have decided. Moreover, the position in
the line may affect your earnings, as we explain next.
Position in the line
To determine the sequence in which depositors make their decision, we carry
out an auction. Each depositor of the bank (the one that will be forced to withdraw
and those who can choose whether to keep their money deposited or withdraw it)
can submit a bid from her initial endowment (0, 1, 2, ..., 20 ECUs) that determines
her position in the line. The depositor with the highest bid will be the first in the
line, the one with the intermediate bid will be the second, and the depositor with
the lowest bid will be the third. If there is a tie in the bids, the positions will be
determined randomly. The amount of money used for bidding is deducted from
your initial endowment of 20 ECUs. You will receive the amount not used for
bidding at the end of the experiment as part of your earnings.
What happens if you withdraw your deposit?
The depositor who is forced to withdraw or any other depositor
who chooses to withdraw will receive 50 ECUs whenever the bank has
enough funds to pay that amount. Therefore, if you are the first or the
second depositor in the sequence of decisions, and you choose to withdraw (or you
are forced to do so), then you earn 50 ECUs (this amount corresponds to your
initial deposit of 40 ECUs + 10 ECUs in the form of interests earned). If you are
the third depositor in the line and you choose to withdraw (or you are forced to
do so), then your earnings depend on what the other two depositors before you
have decided:
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• If only one of the previous two depositors (or none of them) chose to withdraw, you also receive 50 ECUs, because the bank has no problems paying
that amount.
• If both of the depositors who have decided before you chose to withdraw,
then your earnings amount to 20 ECUs (the amount of money that the bank
has after two withdrawals).
To sum up,

What happens if you keep your money deposited?
After paying the depositors who chose to withdraw, the bank carries out a
project and pays a dividend to those depositors who decided to keep their funds
in the bank.
• If two depositors choose to keep their funds deposited, then each of them
earns 70 ECUs, independently of their position in the line.
• If one depositor chooses to keep her funds deposited, she earns 30 ECUs, independently of her position in the line.
To sum up,
As you see, not all three depositors of the same bank may decide to keep their
funds deposited. This is the case because there will be a depositor in each bank
who will be forced to withdraw her funds. This depositor (as the others) can
submit her bid that determines her position in the line, but she cannot choose
between keeping the money deposited or withdrawing.
How many decisions do I have to make in this experiment?
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In this experiment, we ask you to submit a bid as a depositor forced to withdraw and also as one who can choose between keeping her funds deposited or
withdrawing. In both cases, you may submit a bid from your initial endowment
(between 0 and 20 ECUs).
In this experiment, you do not know anything about the bids submitted by the
other depositors, but you can condition your decision of withdrawing or keeping
the money in the bank on what the other depositors decided to do with their
deposits, if they decided before you. Thus, we ask you to tell us what you would
like to do with your deposit (keep it deposited or withdraw it) if you are in the
first, second or third position of the sequence of decision after the auction. Since
you can condition your choice on the decisions of the other depositors of your bank,
you have to make a decision in six potential scenarios:
• What do you do with your deposit if you are the first in the line
• What do you do with your deposit if you are the second in the line, and the
first depositor chose to keep her money in the bank
• What do you do with your deposit if you are the second in the line, and the
first depositor chose to withdraw her funds
• What do you do with your deposit if you are the third in the line, and the
first depositor chose to withdraw her funds, and the second chose to keep
them deposited
• What do you do with your deposit if you are the third in the line, and the
first depositor chose to keep her funds in the bank, and the second chose to
withdraw them
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• What do you do with your deposit if you are the third in the line, and the
two previous depositors chose to withdraw their funds.
Keep in mind when submitting your bid and making your decision, that the
other depositors of your bank can also condition their decision on what you decided.
That is, if you are the first in the line and decide to keep your money deposited
or to withdraw it, the other depositors of your bank may condition their decision
on what they observe.
What information will I have in this experiment?
Next, we show you one of the screens of the experiment so that you can see
the way that we provide you the information.

(The Spanish text is the following: Period 1 of 1, Time (seconds):
Suppose that you are one of the depositors who may choose between keeping
her funds deposited or withdrawing them. We have completed already the auction,
your bid was 0, and after the auction given your bid and those of the rest you are
the second to arrive at the bank. The first depositor decided to withdraw her
deposit.
Remember also your payoff related to keeping your funds deposited and to
withdrawal in this stage given that you are the second in the line and the first one
withdrew her deposit:
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• If you withdraw, then you earn 50 ECUs.
• If you keep your money deposited, then your payoff will be 70 ECUs if the
other depositor who can also keep her funds deposited does so or 30 ECUs
if that depositor decides to withdraw.
Remember that the next depositor will observe your and also the first depositor’s decision. Remember also that one of the other depositors is forced to
withdraw, and the other one has to choose whether to withdraw her money or not,
like you.
(Red buttons:) Keep the deposit in the bank
Withdraw the deposit from the bank
(In the Picture the text below the first / second / third person is High /
Intermediate / Low bid, and the text above the first / second person is Withdraw
/ You.))
Note that in the upper panel, we tell you that you are one of the depositors
who can choose between keeping her funds in the bank and withdrawing. We also
tell you your position in the line and the decisions of the previous depositor. You
can see it also on the right-hand side in the picture where you can see that you
are the second in the line and that the first one has decided to withdraw. On the
left-hand side, we remind you of your payoffs related to withdrawal and keeping
the money deposited. Your decision can be made by clicking the corresponding
button in the lower panel.
What determines your final earnings?
At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly choose one of the
three depositors to be the depositor forced to withdraw. The other two will be
the depositors who can choose between keeping their funds in the bank and withdrawing. All depositors have the same probability of being chosen as the depositor
forced to withdraw.
Once the depositor forced to withdraw is selected, the computer uses the submitted bids to determine the sequence of decisions, and deducts the bids from
the initial endowments of 20 ECUs. Next, the computer tells the decision of each
depositor as a function of the decisions given for all possibilities.
If you are the depositor forced to withdraw, we deduct from your initial endowment of 20 ECUs your bid submitted as the forced depositor. And you will
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earn a payoff depending on your position in the line and the decision of the other
depositors:

In case that you are a depositor who can choose between keeping her funds in
the bank and withdrawing, we deduct from your initial endowment of 20 ECUs
your bid submitted as a depositor who can choose between keeping the money in
the bank and withdrawal. And you will earn a payoff depending on your position
in the line and the decision of the other depositors:

At the end of the experiment, you will receive your earnings in Euros (10 ECUs
= 1 Euro).
Next, we provide some examples so that you can see how the payoffs are calculated. Before starting the experiment, there will be a trial round where you will
be able to see the decision screens for the bidding and the decision of whether to
withdraw or keep the money deposited. This trial round will not affect your final
payoff. We will call your attention when the phase that determines your payoff
begins.
Thanks for participating!
Example 1
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Imagine depositors A, B and C, and assume that the computer selects B as
the depositor forced to withdraw. Here are the bids:

These are then the bids that determine the position:
Bid of depositor A: 5 ECUs
Bid of depositor B: 6 ECUs
Bid of depositor C: 10 ECUs
Therefore, depositor C will be the first, depositor B the second, and depositor
A the third in the line. Remember that when depositor B decides (the second
in the line), she will observe the decision of depositor C (who decides first), and
depositor A (the last one to decide) observes both the decision of depositor C and
that of depositor B. The bids will be deducted from the initial endowment, so
from there depositor A will receive 15 ECUs, depositor B will receive 14 ECUs,
and depositor C will have 10 ECUs. This amount will add to the earnings related
to withdrawing or keeping the funds deposited.
For instance, assume the following decisions (ranked according to the sequence
of decision)
1. - Depositor C: Keep the money deposited
2. - Depositor B: Withdraw (Forced)
3. - Depositor A (after observing that the first one keeps the money in the
bank and the second withdraws): Keep the money deposited
Depositor C and A will receive 70 ECUs, and depositor B receives 50 ECUs
for their decisions.
These earnings add to the earnings resulting from the bid, so depositor A
receives a total of 85 ECUs (15 initial endowment + 70 decision), depositor B
receives a total of 64 ECUs (14 initial endowment + 50 decision), depositor C
receives a total of 80 ECUs (10 initial endowment + 70 decision).
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Now assume the following decisions:
1. - Depositor C: Withdraw
2. - Depositor B: Withdraw (Forced)
3. - Depositor A (after observing two withdrawals): Keep the money deposited
Then depositor C and B will receive 50 ECUs, and depositor A receives 30
ECUs for their decisions.
These earnings add to the earnings resulting from the bid, so depositor A
receives a total of 45 ECUs (15 initial endowment + 30 decision), depositor B
receives a total of 64 ECUs (14 initial endowment + 50 decision), depositor C
receives a total of 60 ECUs (10 initial endowment + 50 decision).
Assume the following decisions:
1. - Depositor C: Withdraw
2. - Depositor B: Withdraw (Forced)
3. - Depositor A (after observing two withdrawals): Withdraw
Then depositor C and B will receive 50 ECUs, and depositor A receives 20
ECUs for their decisions.
These earnings add to the earnings resulting from the bid, so depositor A
receives a total of 35 ECUs (15 initial endowment + 20 decision), depositor B
receives a total of 64 ECUs (14 initial endowment + 50 decision), depositor C
receives a total of 60 ECUs (10 initial endowment + 50 decision).

Example 2
Imagine depositors A, B and C, and assume that the computer selects C as
the depositor forced to withdraw. Here are the bids:

These are then the bids that determine the position:
Bid of depositor A: 5 ECUs
Bid of depositor B: 3 ECUs
Bid of depositor C: 1 ECUs
Therefore, depositor A will be the first, depositor B the second, and depositor
C the third in the line. These bids will be deducted from the initial endowment,

93

so from there depositor A will receive 15 ECUs, depositor B will receive 17 ECUs,
and depositor C will have 19 ECUs. This amount will add to the earnings related
to withdrawing or keeping the funds deposited.
For instance, assume the following decisions (ranked according to the sequence
of decision)
1. - Depositor A: Keep the money deposited
2. - Depositor B (after observing that the first kept her funds deposited):
Withdraw
3. - Depositor C: Withdraw (Forced)
Then depositor B and C will receive 50 ECUs, and depositor A receives 30
ECUs for their decisions. These earnings add to the earnings resulting from the bid,
so depositor A receives a total of 45 ECUs (15 initial endowment + 30 decision),
depositor B receives a total of 67 ECUs (17 initial endowment + 50 decision),
depositor C receives a total of 69 ECUs (19 initial endowment + 50 decision).
Assume the following decisions
1. - Depositor A: Withdraw
2. - Depositor B (after observing that the first withdrew): Withdraw
3. - Depositor C: Withdraw (Forced)
Then depositor A and B will receive 50 ECUs, and depositor C receives 20
ECUs for their decisions. These earnings add to the earnings resulting from the bid,
so depositor A receives a total of 65 ECUs (15 initial endowment + 50 decision),
depositor B receives a total of 67 ECUs (17 initial endowment + 50 decision),
depositor C receives a total of 39 ECUs (19 initial endowment + 20 decision).
Assume the following decisions
1. - Depositor A: Keep the money deposited
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2. - Depositor B (after observing that the first kept her funds deposited): Keep
the money deposited
3. - Depositor C: Withdraw (Forced)
Then depositor A and B will receive 70 ECUs, and depositor C receives 50
ECUs for their decisions. These earnings add to the earnings resulting from the bid,
so depositor A receives a total of 85 ECUs (15 initial endowment + 70 decision),
depositor B receives a total of 87 ECUs (17 initial endowment + 70 decision),
depositor C receives a total of 69 ECUs (19 initial endowment + 50 decision).
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Appendix C. Individual characteristics and bids
Appendix C.1. Elicitation of individual traits
We collect information on individual traits using a questionnaire. Our questionnaire started with the elicitation of age and gender. Then, we elicited risk
attitudes using the bomb risk elicitation task (BRET) by Crosetto and Filippin
(2013). This task requires that subjects decide how many boxes to pick from a
store, each numbered from 0 to 100. Subjects were told that a bomb would be
placed in one of the boxes at random, and they had to decide the number of boxes
they wanted to collect. They would receive 0.10 euros for each box, if the bomb
was not among the chosen boxes, and 0 if they had chosen the box with the bomb.
Crosetto and Filippin (2016) show that this task is appropriate to distinguish subjects according to their risk attitude; in fact, they provide a range for the risk
aversion parameter r ∈ (r0 , r1 ) depending on the number of boxes that a subject
collects, assuming a CRRA utility function, u(k) = k r . We hereafter use the midpoint of this interval as the risk aversion parameter for each of the subjects; i.e.,
our risk aversion parameter for each individual is r = (r1 + r0 )/2. Since r increases
in the number of boxes, we refer to this variable as risk tolerance.
We estimated loss aversion following Gächter et al. (2007). Participants were
presented 5 different lotteries. Each of them paid out 4 Euros if the result of
tossing a coin turned up tails, while subjects would lose an amount between 1 and
5 Euros if the coin turned up heads. Subjects had to indicate whether or not they
would be willing to accept each of the lotteries (see Table C.10).
Table C.10: Elicitation of loss aversion

L1.
L2.
L3.
L4.
L5.

If
If
If
If
If

the
the
the
the
the

coin
coin
coin
coin
coin

turns
turns
turns
turns
turns

up
up
up
up
up

heads,
heads,
heads,
heads,
heads,

then
then
then
then
then

you
you
you
you
you

lose
lose
lose
lose
lose

1;
2;
3;
4;
5;

if
if
if
if
if

the
the
the
the
the

coin
coin
coin
coin
coin

turns
turns
turns
turns
turns

up
up
up
up
up

tails,
tails,
tails,
tails,
tails,

you
you
you
you
you

win
win
win
win
win

4
4
4
4
4

Accept
◦
◦
◦
◦
◦

Reject
◦
◦
◦
◦
◦

If we apply cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), and
assume that subjects assign the same probability weights to the 0.5-chance of
gaining and losing, then the coefficient of loss aversion λ will be given by the ratio
between the utility of winning and losing the gamble, where λ = u(G/L)r under
CRRA utility function (Gächter et al., 2007). In our data, we obtain the degree
of risk aversion r from the BRET and define a loss-averse agent as the one with λ
> 1.
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We followed Halevy (2007) to elicit ambiguity aversion. Subjects were presented a series of urns, composed of a different quantity of colored balls, and they
had to bet on the color of the ball to be drawn from the urn, earning 2 euros if
they guessed correctly (0 euros otherwise). Urn 1 was composed of 5 red and 5
blue balls. Urn 2 also had 10 balls, but the number of red and blue balls was
unknown. After betting on a color in each urn, participants had the opportunity
of selling their bet, asking for a minimal price (in cents) between 0 and 2 Euros.
Then, the computer chose a random number between 0 and 200, and paid it if the
selling price was below. We use the difference in the selling price between urn 1
and urn 2 as a measure of ambiguity aversion.38
The next item in our questionnaire was the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT)
by Frederick (2005). This test consists of three questions that have an intuitive
answer that is wrong. Thus, the test measures the tendency to override the spontaneous response and engage in further reflection to give the correct answer to each
question. We use the number of correct answers in the test to measure cognitive
abilities.39
Our questionnaire included other self-reported variables that were not incentivized. We asked subjects their income level and trust in several institutions
(monarchy, government, army, banks, police, church, and political parties). These
questions were taken from a questionnaire of the Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE). We were especially interested in the trust in banks so that we can
control for the fact that some individuals may not trust banks, and this may affect their propensity to run and withdraw their funds. We also elicited personality
traits using a 48-item Big Five test. Finally, we measured Social Value Orientation
of our participants with the 9-Item Triple-Dominance Measure (Van Lange et al.,
1997).

Appendix C.2. Correlation between individual characteristics and bids
We move now to see how individual traits affect the size of the bid. We begin
with Table C.11 that shows raw correlations between individual traits and bids in
the different informational environments as impatient and patient depositors.40
38

As in the original design of Halevy (2007), we also presented subjects with urn 3 that
contained some number (between 0 and 10) of red balls, the rest of balls being blue; this
number was chosen from a bag with 11 balls numbered from 0 to 10. Finally, urn 4 was
filled with 10 red and 0 blue balls, or with 0 red and 10 blue balls depending on if a 0 or
a 10 was selected from a bag with these two numbers.
39
See Korniotis and Kumar (2010) for the effect of cognitive reflection on financial
decisions and Kiss et al. (2016b) for the case of bank runs.
40
We do not correct here for multiple testing because we just wish to have a first look
at the data and we do not want to draw too far-fetched conclusions.
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Table C.11: Raw correlations between individual traits and bidding as impatient / patient
depositors in different information setups (*/**/*** denotes significance at the 10/5/1%
level.)

Starting from the bottom of Table C.11, we can observe that in the case of
Social Value Orientation and the Big Five personality traits the (absolute value of
the) correlations are rather low, and none is significant at conventional significance
levels. Therefore, it seems that the individual traits captured by these measures
are not related to the bids submitted either as an impatient or a patient depositor
in the simultaneous or sequential setup.
The same is true about family income and trust in banks (and in general
in institutions). Interestingly, uncertainty attitudes measured by our risk and
ambiguity aversion measures show no significant correlation with the bids in any
role and any informational environment.
The rest of the variables exhibits at least some significant correlation with the
bids in some cases. Age is positively correlated with bids in 3 out of 4 cases, indicating that older depositors tend to bid higher amounts (mainly in the sequential

98

setup).41 As impatient depositors, females tend to submit significantly lower bids.
Contrary to our conjecture, loss aversion is weakly negatively correlated with bids,
suggesting that more loss-averse depositors tend to bid less. Cognitive abilities
correlate positively / negatively with bids submitted as the impatient / patient
depositor, and in two cases these correlations are significant. We have no good
story why the effect of cognitive abilities should vary with the type of the depositor. The effect of overconfidence is also somewhat ambiguous, though it seems to
reduce bids in the sequential setup.
41

Age in our sample ranges from 18 to 63, with an average of 22.7, so we have a rather
young pool with some older participants, so this result should be taken with a pinch of
salt.
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Appendix D. Distribution of bids and additional analysis
Appendix D.1. Distribution of bids
Figure D.4 presents the distribution of bids of patient depositors in the NoINFO
treatment, depending on their withdrawal decision. As we mention in the manuscript,
depositors who keep their funds deposited are more likely to submit a zero bid than
those who withdraw their funds from the bank (14% vs 4%).

Figure D.4: Bids of patient depositors in the NoINFO treatment depending on the withdrawal decision.

Figure D.5 depicts the distribution of bids in the INFO treatment, depending
on the beliefs of the impatient depositor regarding the occurrence of bank runs.
We observe that participants are more likely to submit a positive bid if they
expect a bank run; in fact, none of the depositors bid zero if they expect a bank
run. Depositors who expect a bank run bid more on average (7.81 ECus vs 11
ECUs).

Appendix D.2. Robustness checks
We estimate a negative binomial-logit maximum-likelihood hurdle model for
the bidding behavior of depositors in the NoINFO treatment, depending on the
depositors’ type (patient or impatient) and whether or not the depositor expects
a bank run. Our results in Table D.12 provide further evidence that beliefs on the
occurrence of bank runs are crucial to explaining whether or not depositors bid a
positive amount in this environment -the dummy variable ”Belief bank run” takes
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Figure D.5: Bids of impatient depositors in the INFO treatment depending on their beliefs
on the occurrence of bank runs.

the value 1 if the depositor expects a bank run. The depositor’s type does not
seem to affect the bids, and patient depositors are less likely to bid zero if they
want to withdraw their deposit from the bank.
Logit regression (bid = 0)
(1a)
(2a)
Constant
Belief bank run
Patient depositor
Belief * Patient

-2.042***
(0.259)
-13.66***
(0.342)
0.337
(0.408)
-0.339
(0.610)

-2.351***
(0.430)
-13.86***
(0.502)
0.759
(0.538)
0.260
(0.825)
-14.09***
(0.496)

2.210***
(0.047)
0.051
(0.127)
-0.054
(0.080)
-0.229
(0.273)

2.227***
(0.063)
-0.015
(0.136)
-0.061
(0.081)
-0.136
(0.295)
-0.086
(0.212)

252

168

252

168

Patient * Withdraw
Observations

Negative binomial (bid > 0)
(1b)
(2b)

Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table D.12: Bidding behavior in the NoINFO treatment

Tables D.13 - D.16 replicate the analysis in the main text for the bidding
behavior of patient and impatient depositors in the simultaneous and the INFO
treatment. In our regressions below, we restrict the analysis to those subjects who
submitted their bids thinking in their position in the line. Our results support
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the main conclusions in the text: beliefs on the occurrence of bank runs and the
intention to withdraw are crucial to explaining bidding in the NoINFO treatment,
where loss aversion and gender also have a predictive power. In the INFO treatment, there is evidence that patient depositors are more likely to bid if they are
irrational or want to keep their deposit in the bank, and loss averse depositors bid
more. For impatient depositors in the INFO treatment, beliefs on the occurrence
of bank runs seem to be the main determinant of their bids.
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Table D.13: Bidding behavior of patient depositors in the NoINFO treatment
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Table D.14: Bidding behavior of impatient depositors in the NoINFO treatment
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Table D.15: Bidding behavior of impatient depositors in the INFO treatment
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Table D.16: Bidding behavior of impatient depositors in the INFO treatment

